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AND RETROACTIVE
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AmIImTRATrVE agencies make rules which if valid have the full
force of law, they issue interpretative rules having varying degrees of
authoritative weight, they publish many kinds of announcements and
releases and opinions and rulings whose legal effect is frequently un-
clear, and they establish and follow practices and usages which in some
practical respects are almost the equivalent of rules.
This article will discuss (1) the nature of administrative rules, the
efforts at definition, and the problem of interpreting the definition pro-
vided by the Administrative Procedure Act; (2) the vital but partially
false theory concerning the distinction between legislative and inter-
pretative rules; (3) some of the factors which especially affect the au-
thoritative weight which courts give to interpretative rules; and (4)
problems concerning the retroactive operation of both legislative and
interpretative rules.
I. THE PROBLEM OF DEFInITION
Even before the Administrative Procedure Act added new obstacles
to the task, probably no effort to provide a precise definition of the
term "rule" was wholly successful. Yet its core of meaning is generally
understood and may be simply described. A rule is the product of rule-
making, and rule-making is the part of the administrative process that
resembles a legislature's enactment of a statute. Adjudication is the
part of the administrative process that resembles a court's decision of a
case. Admittedly this analogy to statutes and to decisions of courts is
imperfect and is of little use in trying to classify borderline or mixed
activities. But precise definition in the abstract is not necessarily desir-
able, for the same function may well be regarded as rule-making for one
purpose or in one context and as something else for some other purpose
or in another context.' Here as elsewhere throughout the law a proper
* Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law.
1. This is what the Supreme Court usually does. For instance, rate fxing for the
future had been held legislative for various purposes in many cases. Prentis v. Atlantic
Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1903) ; Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough,
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classification requires that both the purpose and the effect of the partic-
ular classification be taken into account. For practical law-making,
definitions must draw from special circumstances accompanying par-
ticular problems. Play in the joints of the case-to-case method is for
this purpose especially meritorious, as it is in giving meaning to such
concepts as "due process of law" and "income."
Often the best solution of the problem of classifying borderline activ-
ities is to avoid classifying them-to skip the labelling and to proceed
directly to the problem at hand. Thus, if the problem is to determine
appropriate procedure for a particular activity, the practical procedural
needs may be studied without calling the activity either rule-making or
something else; usually nothing will be lost if the activity is regarded as
borderline or mixed or unclassifiable.
One of the most helpful definitions of rule-making is that of Professor
Fuchs, who concludes that rule-making should be defined as "the issu-
ance of regulations or the making of determinations which are addressed
to indicated but unnamed and unspecified persons or situations." 2 An-
other definition is-that of Mr. Dickinson: "What distinguishes legisla-
tion from adjudication is that the former affects the rights of individuals
in the abstract and must be applied in a further proceeding before the
legal position of any particular individual will be definitely touched by
it; while adjudication operates concretely upon individuals in their in-
dividual capacity." I A definition which has produced many unsatis-
factory practical results I is that of Mr. Justice Holmes: "a judicial
inquiry investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities as they stand on
present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. That
is its purpose and end. Legislation, on the other hand, looks to the
future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule, to be
applied thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its power. The
establishment of a rate is the making of a rule for the future, and there-
fore is an act legislative, not judicial. . . ." I
Each of these efforts at definition is (necessarily, probably) in some
way lacking in precision. Rules are typically designed to apply to un-
named parties, but, like private bills enacted by a legislature, rules
253 U.S. 287, 289 (1920); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38,
50 (1936). But when the question came along as to what procedure should be followed
for fixing stockyard agencies' rates, the Court said that, for that purpose, fixing rates
for the future called for "quasi-judicial" procedure. See Morgan v. United States, 298
U.S. 468, 480 (1936).
2. Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52 HARv. L. Rnv. 259, 265
(1938).
3. DicKiNsoN, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW 21 (1927).
4. For a sample of an undesirable consequence of this definition, a ease permeated
with conceptualism and unrealism, see Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma G. & E. Co.,
309 U.S. 4 (1940).
5. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908).
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or amendments of rules may sometimes be directed to a problem of a
named individual or a small group.' Adjudications are typically de-
signed to apply to named parties, usually only a few, but, like cases in
courts, adjudications may involve hundreds or thousands of parties,
and members of classes need not necessarily be named. 7 Rules may
often need to be applied in a further proceeding before the legal position
of any individual will be definitely touched by them, but, like statutes,
rules are normally obeyed without enforcement proceedings, just as
adjudications ordinarily guide conduct without enforcement proceed-
ings. Rules ordinarily look to the future, although, like statutes, they
are occasionally retroactive.8 Relatively, adjudication looks backwards,
typically applying law and policy to past facts, but, like equity decrees,
declaratory judgments, and even orders to pay money, adjudications
may be primarily concerned with the future.
Attempted definitions of rule-making usually try to differentiate be-
tween rule-making and adjudication and do not attempt to draw a line
between interpretative rules 9 and various kinds of announcements, in-
terpretations, opinions, releases, rulings, practices, usages, and policies.
Something that either is akin to rule-making or is rule-making takes
place when particular courses of official action are repeatedly followed.
More than a century ago the Supreme Court observed that "usages
have been established in every department of the government, which
have become a kind of common law, and regulate the rights and duties
of those who act within their respective limits." 10 In the Portal-to-
Portal Act of 1947, Congress gave a special legal effect to "any adminis-
trative regulation, order, ruling, approval, or interpretation, of any
agency of the United States, or any administrative practice or enforce-
ment policy of any such agency." " Congress was relieving employers
from liability under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Walsh-Healey
Act, and the Bacon-Davis Act when they act in good faith in reliance
on the administrative interpretation. Therefore an "administrative
practice or enforcement policy," even when unannounced or wholly
negative, may sometimes have about the same effect as a formal rule.
An agency may announce policies in connection with deciding cases,
6. Thus, § 3 (a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 STAT. 237, 5 U.S.C.2.
§1001 (1946), provides for publication in the Federal Register of certain rules, "but not
rules addressed to and served upon named persons...." See discussion of the Act, p. 924
et seq. infra.
7. For instance, FED. R. Cv. P., 23(a) allows class actions in certain circumstances
"if persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring
them all before the court."
& See the discussion of retroactive rule-making, p. 944 et seq. infra.
9. See the discussion of the difference between legislative rules and interpretative
rules, p. 928 et seq. infra.
10. United States v. Macdaniel, 7 Pet. 1, 14-5 (U.S. 1833).
11. 61 STAT. 88, 89 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§258, 259.
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or informally through press releases or reports or speeches, or formally
through regulations. The practical effect of each of these three courses
is often almost the same, and yet a good deal may hinge on the form.
In Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States,12 the Supreme Court
divided five to three in holding that regulations of the Federal Com-
munications Commission were a reviewable "order" though they merely
announced a policy as to circumstances in which the Commission would,
deny licenses. The majority conceded that a mere press release would
not be reviewable, and the minority argued that a press release would
have the same practical impact. The majority, however, emphasized
that the regulations were "avowedly" adopted in the exercise of the
rule-making power, and that they were "couched in terms of com-
mand." The line was drawn largely in reliance on mere form. Under
any view an attempt to distinguish a rule from an announcement of
policy which is not a rule seems likely to yield a fuzzy product, as it did
in the Columbia Broadcasting case. The Communications Commission
issued in 1946 a pamphlet known as "the Blue Book"; as a statement
of policies, it has many of the attributes of regulations, and yet tech-
nically its statements are not rules.13 In some circumstances even a
speech of a commissioner may have about the same effect as formal
rules, especially if the speech authoritatively states enforcement or ad-
judication policy. If by any informal method a prosecuting agency
makes known what it will not prosecute, the result is closely akin to a rule.
The term "ruling" signifies an interpretation or an application of a
rule or statute or practice to a particular situation. Rulings usually
have some of the qualities of both rules and decisions. Sometimes the
important effect is establishment of a rule for the future, and sometimes
the primary impact is on a named party. A local War Price and Ration-
ing Board deciding who in wartime may buy a pair of rubber boots
exemplifies the blending of rule-making with adjudication.1 4 What the
Federal Reserve Board calls "rulings" are said to "partake somewhat
of the characteristics of individual case decisions, of interpretations, of
advisory or advance opinions, and of implementations of the statutes
and the regulations themselves." '6 Advisory opinions may have some
or most or all of the characteristics of rules, as in various kinds of in-
terpretative work in the Securities and Exchange Commission."0 The
12. 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
13. Hearst Radio v. FCC, 165 F2d 225 (App. D.C. 1948).
14. See Oppenheimer, The War Price and Rationing Boards, 43 COL. L. REv. 147
(1943).
15. Arry GEn. Com. AD. PRoc., MoNoGRAPH, Part 9, Federal IReserve System 20
(1940).
. 16. The Federal Register for Sept. 27, 1946, contains a large compilation of SEC
interpretative regulations and related materials, called releases, letters or opinions of
officers, letters of the Commission, statements of the Commission, and the like. See
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Wage and Hour Division issues interpretative bulletins of a general
character, and other statements which are general or specific or mixed-
opinion letters, opinions of the Solicitor's office and "releases".
17
In the Treasury Department's arsenal of rules and rulings of varying
dignity, not only does the relative weight of each type of pronounce-
ment remain uncertain but frequently amendments of rules cannot be
distinguished from interpretations or new applications. That "Regula-
tions" are amended by "Treasury Decisions" reflects the merger of
rule-making with informal adjudication. Regulations and Treasury
Decisions are of higher dignity than memoranda of the General Counsel
(G.C.M.'s), rulings of the Income Tax Unit of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (I.T.'s), and "Mimeographs." The Department's Cumulative
Bulletin formally cautions that the various rulings show "the trend of
official opinion in the administration of the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
the rulings other than Treasury Decisions have none of the force or effect
of Treasury Decisions and do not commit the Department to any inter-
pretation of the law which has not been formally approved and promul-
gated by the Treasury." 18 The difficulty is exemplified by the fact that
the Supreme Court has quoted and applied the Treasury's words of
caution,19 has asserted that "departmental rulings not promulgated by
the Secretary are of little aid in interpreting a tax statute," :3 and has
given weight to I.T.'s 21 and to an opinion of the General Counsel.22
A few unanswered questions illustrate some remaining puzzles. If
the Maritime Commission or the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
through negotiation fixes the amount of a government subsidy, is the
process rule-making or adjudication or neither? If the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board after a formal hearing resembling a trial fixes airmail subsi-
dies, is the nature of the function different because of the procedural
methods? Does the nature of the function of awarding a subsidy depend
upon whether the government is merely acting in its proprietary capac-
ity or whether the statute creates a "right" in the recipient? Is the
determination of what rate is reasonable adjudication when the purpose
is reparation and rule-making when no reparation is involved? Does
the classification of rate-fixing depend on whether reparation is insig-
nificant or whether reparation is the main interest? Is inspection of an
Blair-Smith, Forms of Administrative Interpretation under the Securities Law's, 26
IowA L. REv. 241 (1941).
17. See 2 CCH, LAB. LAW Sav. 33,000 et seq. (1946).
18. This caution appears in fine print in each issue of the Bulletin.
19. Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455, 463 (1934).
20. Biddle v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 573, 5S2 (193S).
21. McFeely v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 102, 10 (1935).
22. Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 303 U.S. 90, 93 (1939). See Griswold, A Sum-
mary of the Regdatlions Problem, 54 HAnv. L. Rr.v. 398, 418 n.60 (1941), asserting that
"Bureau practice is Bureau practice, and when it clearly appears and has been long-
continued, it should be given effect regardless of the form in which it appears."
1948]
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airplane or a ship or a locomotive adjudication even when it involves
formulation of a new rule or a new application of an old rule? If in
deciding a case the agency overrules a line of decisions thought of as a
"rule," and announces a new "rule" for the future, is the agency en-
gaged in rule-making? The War Production Board issued sweeping
regulations without advance knowledge of what interests might be un-
fairly pinched, allowing "appeals" to its Industry Division and further
to the War Production Board Appeals Board for exceptions or special
modifications of regulations-were the appeals tribunals engaged in
rule-making or adjudication or both? 23 Does it make any difference
whether the order of the appellate tribunal takes the form of special
dispensation to the applicant or whether the rule is formally modified?
Is the process of determining broad policy or substantive law in the
nature of legislation or rule-making no matter what kind of proceeding
it is attached to, and is the process of finding disputed facts from con-
flicting evidence in the nature of adjudication no matter what kind of
proceedings it is attached to?
Questions like these can be multiplied indefinitely. Sometimes rules
are identifiable because they are unmixed with other administrative
output. Sometimes rules are blended with decisions or with informal
interpretations or with prosecuting or with supervising. Mixed or un-
classifiable functions are constantly carried on satisfactorily without
any definite labelling. When some practical question hinges on the
label, then the label should be affixed with an eye to producing a good
result in the particular case--and for many such functions the need for
affixing the label may never arise.
If the legislators were omniscient and had at their disposal linguistic
precision tools, the interpreter's function would involve no more than
finding and applying the meaning of words. But since legislators can
neither anticipate all problems nor define terms with minute exactness,
judges must necessarily cooperate with legislators in trying to build a
sound and workable system. Judges who rest interpretations solely
upon abstract meanings of words fail to do their part as working part-
ners with legislators. The meaning of such a term as "rule" must fre-
quently depend not only upon word contexts but also upon practical
contexts.
The Administrative Procedure Act.
One criterion for distinguishing rules from decisions has long been
the idea that rules typically apply to unnamed parties but that deci-
sions typically apply to named parties. The Administrative Procedure
Act seems on its face to reject this criterion and to rely almost alto-
23. See O'Brian and Fleischmann, The War Production Board Administrative
Policies and Procedures 13 GEO. WAsH. L. R v. 1 (1944).
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gether on the idea that rules must be of future effect. Section 2 pro-
vides:
(c) "Rule" means the whole or any part of any agency statement of
general or particular applicability and future effect designed to
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or to describe the
organization, procedure, or practice requirements of any agency and
includes the approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages,
corporate or financial structures or reorganizations thereof, prices,
facilities, appliances, services or allowances therefor or of valua-
tions, costs, or accounting, or practices bearing upon any of the
foregoing. "Rule making" means agency process for the formu-
lation, amendment, or repeal of a rule.
(d) "Order" means the whole or any part of the final disposition
(whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form)
of any agency in any matter other than rule making but including
licensing. "Adjudication" means agency process for the formula-
tion of an order.
(e) "License" includes the wiwle or part of any part of any agency
permit, certificate, approval, registration, charter, membership,
statutory exemption or other form of permission. "Licensing" in-
cludes agency process respecting the grant, renewal, denial, revoca-
tion, suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation, amendment,
modification, or conditioning of a license.
The surprising feature lies in the words "or particular" in the defi-
nition of rule as "any agency statement of general or particular ap-
plicability and future effect. . . ." If these words "or particular" are
literally applied, almost every process except licensing becomes rule-
making. An order requiring specified affirmative action in the future,
such as an order of the NLRB requiring the employer to reinstate em-
ployees with back pay, fits perfectly the Act's definition of "rule." 24
Yet prior to the Act such a proceeding was a typical example of adjudi-
cation. An ordinary award of money, either a determination requiring
A to pay B, or a determination that X is entitled to a payment from
government funds, comes within the Act's definition of "rule," literally
interpreted-the essence of what has heretofore been regarded as ad-
judication. To interpret the Act as meaning that an award of repara-
tion, or of workmen's compensation, or of a social security benefit is a
"rule" would be nothing short of ludicrous. Such an interpretation
would rob provisions of the Act relating to "adjudication" of virtually
all meaning, for such provisions would apply to hardly anything except
24. The word "injunctive" in the definition of "order" would probably prevent a
cease and desist order from being considered a rule, even under a literal interpretation.
Of the addition of the word "injunctive," the House Committee explained: "This addi-
tion is prompted by the fact that some people interpret 'future effect' as used in defining
rule making, to include injunctive action, whereas the latter is traditionally and clearly
adjudication. It is made even more necessary that this matter be clarified because of the
1948]
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a part of licensing. The reasons are overwhelming for giving the Act's
definition some interpretation other than the strictly literal one, if the
broad congressional intent is to be given effect.
The legislative history yields a satisfactory solution. In early drafts,
"rule" was defined as "any agency statement of general applicability
designed to implement .. ." 25 The manifest purpose was to provide
a definition which would adopt the accepted meaning. That purpose
was never changed. True, the words "or particular" were added. But
the legislative history is very clear as to the purpose of that addition.
The House Judiciary Committee reported: "The change of language
to embrace specifically rules of 'particular' as well as 'general' appli-
cability is necessary in order to avoid controversy and assure cover-
age of rule making addressed to named persons." 20 The traditional
meaning of the word "rule" remains, 2 1 and is clarified by the specific
language of Section 2(c), but the words "or particular" are added to
make sure that what has traditionally been regarded as a rule will still
be a rule even though it has particular instead of general applicability.
2 8
The words "or particular" were not intended to change into rule-
making what has heretofore been regarded as adjudication. Those
words mean no more than that what is otherwise rule-making does not
become adjudication merely because it applies only to particular parties
or to a particular situation.
29
The overall result is that "rule" still has about the same meaning as
it did before the Act, except that the Act clarifies some points that were
amendment of section 2(c) to embrace clearly particularized rule making. . . ." SLIN.
Dor. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 283 (1946).
25. See e.g., the Senate Judiciary Committee Print of June, 1945, Sm. Doc. No. 248,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1946). At page 14 the Senate Committee says: "The definition
of rule making and rule follows essentially the definitions of the Federal Register
Act . . ." The clear intent was to make no change in the traditional meaning.
26. Appendix A of the House Committee Report, id. at 283, n.1.
See the more complete account of the legislative history in Ginnane, "Rule Making,"
"Adutdicationr" and Exemptions Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 95 U. oF PA.
L. REv. 621, 622 et seq. (1947).
27. Great practical advantage, of course, will ensue from following the traditional
meaning of the terms. Much can be said for the proposal of the Attorney General's Com-
mittee, whose bill merely used the term "rules" without defining it REP. ATr'" Grx.
Comm. AD. PaoC. 192 et seq. (1941). The same is true of the bill proposed by the
minority of that Committee, which defined the word in terms of itself: "'Rules' means
rules, regulations, standards, statements of policy. . . ." Id. at 218.
28. The addition of the words "or particular" came very late in the bill's history-
after enactment by the Senate. The change came in a committee report dated May 3,
1946. SEN. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 283 (1946).
29. This interpretation is not only fully supported by the legislative history but it
is a remarkably simple solution of the troublesome problem created by the words "or
particular." That problem has caused considerable consternation. Many of the speakers
and questioners at the New York University Institute were perplexed by it. See FrDERAL
ADmixisTRPArv PaOCEDUR ACT AND THE- ADmiIsRATIE AGENCIES (1947) passim.
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doubtful. The definition of Professor Fuchs emphasizing "unframed
and unspecified persons or situations" ^- is still a good definition, except
that under the Act a rule may also apply to named or specified persons
or situations when it has enough other characteristics of a rule. Before
the Act, the nature of licensing was doubtful;3' under the Act all licens-
ing functions are explicitly classified as adjudication. Before the Act,
prescribing or approving plans of corporate reorganization might well
have been regarded as adjudication, since that function is one which
courts customarily perform; 32 under the Act approving or prescribing
corporate or financial structures or reorganizations thereof is rule-mak-
ing. Before the Act, prescribing rates and wages and prices for the fu-
ture was probably legislative for most purposes: 3 but nevertheless
sometimes required a "quasi-judicial" procedure; 14 under the Act, the
procedural requirements designed for adjudication do not apply to pre-
scribing rates and wages and prices for the future. Before the Act, in-
dependent valuation proceedings, like those conducted over several
decades to find the valuation of railroad properties, probably could not
be classified definitely as either rule-making or adjudication; under the
Act such proceedings are rule-making.
The Act by no means solves all problems of classifying proceedings as
rule-making or adjudication. Most questions concerning classification
of borderline and mixed functions still remain. Indeed, the Act adds
some new difficulties to such problems. The same function may come
within the Act's definition of rule-making and also -ithin the Act's
definition of licensing. The disposition of an application to the Wage
and Hour Division for an exemption from wage and hour requirements
is a rule, because it implements wage fixing for the future, and at the
same time it is a license, which the Act defines as "any agency permit,
. . . approval, . . . or other form of permission." A Federal Reserve
Board "ruling".is a rule because it implements a statute, and it is also
a license if it grants an approval or permit. Granting or denying an
exception to the long-and-short-haul clause is licensing under the Act's
definition, and it is also rule-making because it involves practices re-
lated to rates for the future.
Of course the way to solve problems of classifying activities which
analytically fall into more than one category or into no category is to
30. Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Ride-Ma!:ing, 52 H'nv. L RLx. 259, 165
(1938).
31. In Federal Radio Commission v. General Elec. Co., 2,31 U. S. 464 (1930), and
in other similar cases, licensing was held non-judicial for purposes of determining whether
de novo review was permissible.
32. See Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Bankers Trust Co., 318 U. S. 163, 170-71
(1943).
33. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, 226 (1903).
34. Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 480 (1936).
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keep 'an eye on producing a good practical result in the particular case.
The various provisions of Section 5 apply only to adjudication, never to
rule-making. Courts' ideas about the desirability or undesirability of
applying the requirements of Section 5 to a particular proceeding should
assist the classification in each case.3 5 Except when the meaning of
authoritative words is beyond dispute, the choice of labels should de-
pend largely upon judgments concerning practical results.
II. THE DISTINCTION B ETWEEN INTERPRETATIVE AND
LEGISLATIVE RULES
The Administrative Procedure Act exempts "interpretative rules"
from the Act's procedural requirements, without defining the term."°
The meaning of the term must be found in case law, in practices of
agencies, and in usage. Resort to such materials reveals a theoretical
distinction which has played an important role but which has been
sometimes ignored, a distinction which is weak in the borderland and
in some respects is even positively misleading. Yet a full examination
of the theoretical distinction is indispensable to understanding admin-
istrative rules.
According to the theory, legislative rules are the product of a power
to create new law, and interpretative rules are the product of interpre-
tation of previously existing law. 3 Legislative rules may change the
law but interpretative rules merely clarify the law they interpret.3"
35. This is probably the best way to carry out such congressional intent as is dis-
coverable. See Ginnane, "Rule Making," "Adjudication" and Exemptions Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 95 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 621, 627 (1947) : "Significantly, while
the definitions of 'rule' and 'order' were being drastically rewritten, the principal operat-
ing sections-4, 5, 7 and 8-remained largely untouched. This suggests that the defini-
tions were adjusted in order to fit the operating provisions to the needs of various agency
functions, and that the rationalization of the definitions lies in the impact of those pro-
visions upon various types of such functions."
36. Sec. 4(a).
37. For expositions of the distinction between legislative rules and interpretative
rules, see COMER, LEGISLATIVE FuNCTIONs OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE AUTuORITIES
c. V (1927); FIELD, COLUMBIA INcoME TAX LacruPEs 96-8 (1921); Lee, Legislative
and Interpretative Regulations, 29 G~o. L. J. 1 (1940) ; Surrey, The Scope and Effect of
Treasury Regulations under the Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes, 88 UNiv. OF PA. L. Ray.
556 (1940) ; Alvord, Treantry Regulations and the Wilshire Oil Case, 40 COL. L. Rav.
252, 258 et seq. (1940).
The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure said: "Administra-
tive rule-making ... includes the formulation of both legally binding regulations and
interpretative regulations. The former receive statutory force upon going into effect.
The latter do not receive statutory force and their validity is subject to challenge in any
court proceeding in which their application may be in question, The statutes themselves
and not the regulations remain in theory the sole criterion of what the law authorizes
or compels and what it forbids." Ra'. A'r'y GEm. COMM. AD. PRoc. 100 (1941).
38. See the discussion of the difficulties or impossibilities of translating this theory
into practice, p. 932 et seq. infra.
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Valid legislative rules have the same force and effect as valid statutes;
the rules are valid if proper procedure is followed and if they are within
the statutory and constitutional authority of the agency. Since inter-
pretative rules theoretically do not embody new law but merely inter-
pret previous law, they are valid only if the reviewing court finds the
interpretation a permissible one. In theory, reviewing courts may no
more substitute their judgment on policies declared by legislative rules
than they may substitute their judgment on policies declared by stat-
utes. But since interpretative rules are supposed to be merely interpre-
tations of previous law, courts often deem themselves free to substitute
their judgment as to content of interpretative rules. As will be detailed
subsequently, however, the courts have evolved a number of doctrines
to guide judicial self-restraint.s
Although assertions have been made that authority to make legisla-
tive rules must be specifically delegated,-' and although such authority
usually is not inherent in other administrative tasks, yet both legisla-
tive and interpretative rules may clearly rest upon statutory authority
which is either express or implied. An agency with power to adjudicate
may announce policies or rules it intends to follow; such an announce-
ment often has the practical effect of legislative rules. This is essentially
what the Federal Communications Commission did, for instance, in
issuing chain broadcasting regulations.4' The regulations provided that
the Commission would grant no license to a station having specified
relationships with networks. The Commission said the regulations "are
nothing more than the expression of the general policy we will follow
in exercising our licensing power .... ,, 42 The power to issue regula-
tions governing the contractual relationships between stations and net-
works was not specifically conferred by the Act. To sustain the regula-
Compare Coxmra, LEGiSLATIV Fus coNs OF NATIo.AL ADmX.'sTSIATSn AUrTH0-
Tais 29 (1927): "Administrative [legislative] rules, the very essence of complementary
or detailed legislation, are those that appreciably add to the procedural or enforcing pro-
visions of substantive law and are enforceable; they involve the discretion of a lav maher
on the part of the Executive; and their source of authority is found in a general statutory
delegation of rule-making power, in a delegation of a general character for a particular
law, or in a specific delegation for a particular provision of a law. Interpretative regu-
lations supposedly express ihe true meaning of a statute or division thereof; they are not
in themselves law...."
39. For instance, the Supreme Court has said: "Treasury regulations and interpreta-
tions long continued without substantial change, applying to unamended or substantially
re-enacted statutes, are deemed to have received congressional approval and have the
effect of law." Helvering v. WVinmill, 305 U. S. 79, 83 (1938). That this statement goes
somewhat further than later, better-considered decisions, see pp. 939-43 infra.
40. E.g., Alvord, Treasury Reguldaions and the Wilshdre Oil Case, 40 Cor. L REV.
252, 259 (1940). See also Brown, Regulations, Recnctment, a=d thw Ret,'cic Acts, 54
HARV. L. Rnv. 377, 384-5 (1941).
41. Cf. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, 316 U. S. 407 (1942).
42. Id. at 411.
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tions the Supreme Court was forced to.look to the general purposes and
framework of the Act.43 Dissenting Justices said the Court had fabri-
cated authority.44 That the Court regarded the regulations as legisla-
tive and not merely as interpretative is proved by its remark concerning
the scope of judicial review: "Our duty is at an end when we find that
the action of the Commission was based upon findings supported by
evidence, and was made pursuant to authority granted by Congress." 41
Although the power to issue interpretative regulations is commonly
inherent or implied, it may be expressly conferred. A leading example
of interpretative regulations is the huge bulk of tax regulations issued
by the Treasury Department, most of which now rest upon Section
3791(a) of the Internal Revenue Code: "The Commissioner, with the
approval of the Secretary, shall prescribe and publish all needful rules
and regulations for the enforcement of this title." 4 But many provi-
sions of the tax regulations (one commentator counted 56 in the income
tax law in 1940) 4 are legislative rules, because they spring from grants
of power to create new law. For instance, Section 23(m) provides for a
"reasonable allowance" for depletion "under rules and regulations to
be prescribed by the Commissioner, with the approval of the Secre-
tary." 48
A prominent example of interpretative rules not resting upon a statu-
tory grant of rule-making power is the Interpretative Bulletins of the
Wage and Hour Division. Interpretative Bulletin No. 1, dealing with
coverage, recites that the Act confers no power upon the Administrator
to issue regulations concerning coverage, and that a draft of the bill
providing for issuance of such regulations had been rejected. Neverthe-
less, the Administrator issued the Bulletin, explaining that it serves
"to indicate merely the construction of the law which will guide the
Administrator in the performance of his administrative duties, unless
and until he is directed otherwise by authoritative ruling of the courts."
Despite this disclaimer of power, the Supreme Court in 1940 said that
the administrative interpretations are entitled to "great weight." 11
Then in: 1944 the Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion discussed at
length the effect of what it called the "interpretative regulations." 11
43. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 218-9 (1943).
44. Id. at 238.
45. Id. at 224.
46. See also INT. REv. CoDon § 62.
47. Alvord, Treamry Regulation and the Wilshire Oil Case, 40 CoL. L. REV. 252,
258 (1940).
48. 53 STAT. 14 (1939), 26 U.S.C. § 23 (1940). The Court apparently treated as legis-
lative the rules issued pursuant to this provision, in Douglas v. Commissioner, 322 U. S.
275 (1944).
49. United States v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 549
(1940).
50. Slidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944).
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The Court said the Interpretative Bulletin and the informal rulings
"provide a practical guide to employers and employees as to how the
office representing the public interest in its enforcement will seek to
apply it," 51 but that "they are not, of course, conclusive." 52 After
pointing out the silence of the statute as to what deference courts should
pay to administrative interpretations, the Court declared: "The weight
of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thorough-
ness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its con-
sistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." 13 This
is decidedly different from the effect given to a legislative regulation
issued by the same agency; a'wage order, for instance, is binding upon
the courts if the procedure followed is proper, if the order is supported
by substantial evidence, and if it is within the agency's statutory and
constitutional authority.
5 4
The Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, as we have seen, modified the Fair
Labor Standards Act so as to give additional effect to administrative
interpretations. 5 By the amendment Congress specifically recognized
the difference between interpretative and legislative regulations. Be-
fore 1947 the courts were free to supplant the Administrator's interpre-
tative bulletins with their own interpretations. The Administrator in
his 1944 annual report stated the inadequacies of interpretative regula-
tions: "At the present time, the Administrator has no power to issue
authoritative interpretations of the general provisions of the Act. This
is highly unsatisfactory because it means that an employer who com-
plies with the Administrator's interpretation on a doubtful question
can never be sure that he will not be subjected to liability in an em-
ployee suit. . . . Accordingly, I recommend that the Act be amended
to give the Administrator power to make regulations necessary or ap-
propriate to implement the Act's provisions ... " No doubt an
51. Id. at 138.
52. Id. at 139.
53. Id. at 140.
54. E.g., Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U. S. 126, 154 (1941). The
holding as to scope of review rested on the statutory provision. For a holding to the same
effect, but not resting on a specific statutory provision, cf. National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U. S. 190, 224 (1943).
55. 61 STAT. 88, 89 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. §§258, 259 (Supp. 1947). These provisions
amend not only the Fair Labor Standards Act but also the WValsh-Healey Act and the
Bacon-Davis Act.
56. WAGE AxD Honk Ai PUBIc Coxvnmcrs Dxvxsios, Aiur. Rm. 7 (1944). The
recommendation is renewed in the 1945 Annual Report at p. 1. The Administrator
goes on to make the highly questionable statement: "It will be observed that the Treasury
Regulations under the Revenue Acts are almost an exact precedent for the procedure now
proposed!' The trouble with this observation is that the bulk of the Treasury Regula-
tions have about the same legal effect as the Wage-Hour Administrator's Interpretative
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employer who complied with interpretative regulations and was still
made a defendant in a suit by employees for double the deficiencies in
back pay could see quite clearly that the distinction between interpre-
tative and legislative rules has been not merely academic."7 The Portal-
to-Portal Act provides that an employer shall not be liable if he com-
plied in good faith with any administrative interpretation, notwith-
standing later modification or rescission of the interpretation or its
invalidation by judicial authority. The effect is to give force of law to
administrative interpretations in the employer's favor when the em-
ployer relies on them, but to withhold force of law from administrative
interpretations which operate against the employer's interest; the regu-
lations are now legislative for one purpose and remain interpretative
for other purposes."
Nearly all the regulations issued by the Secretary of Agriculture un-
der the Food and Drug Act of 1906 concerning standards for food were
interpretative-merely "a guide for officials of this department in en-
forcing the Food and Drug Act." 1 A long struggle for a grant of power
to issue legislative regulations was partially won in 1930 11 and fully
won in 1938.61 The differences between the interpretative regulations
issued under the 1906 Act and the legislative regulations issued under
the 1938 Act are very real, not merely theoretical. 2
Although the theoretical distinction between legislative and inter-
pretative rules is often clear, the practice does not always follow the
theory, and in the borderland between the two kinds of rules, the differ-
ences, if any, are sometimes obscured or ignored. For instance, the
Fair Labor Standards Act provides that the Act shall not apply "to any
individual employed within the area of production (as defined by the
Administrator), engaged in . ..canning of agricultural or horticul-
tural commodities for market. . . ." 11 This provision grants power to
Bulletins. See Herman, The Administration and Enforcement of the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 368, 378-9 (1939).
57. But compare the statement made editorially in KATZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 162 (1947): "Interpretative regulations bind the persons whom
they purport to affect and the administrative agencies which promulgate them in the same
manner and within the same limits as other types of regulations."
58. Compare the provision of the Securities Act quoted in note 165 infra.
59. Lee, Legislative and Interpretative Regulations, 29 GEo. L. J. 1, 9 (1940) ; Cavers,
The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938; Legislative History and Substantive Provi-
sions, 6 LAW & CoNTEmp. PRoB. 2 (1939).
60. The McNary-Mapes Amendment, 46 STAT. 1019 (1930), 21 U.S.C. § 10 (1940).
61. The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 52 STAT. 1040 (1938) 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1940).
62. Under the former Act courts have even held to be adulterated or misbranded food
which complied with the Department's interpretative regulations. United States v. One
Hundred Barrels of Vinegar, 188 FED. 471 (D. Minn. 1911); United States v, Six Bar-
rels of Ground Pepper, 253 Fed. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). The new Act provides that food
is adulterated or misbranded if it fails to conform to the administrative regulations.
63. 52 STAT. 1067 (1938), 29 U.S.C. §213(a) (1940). The Supreme Court held
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make rules which if valid have force of law, and yet the test of validity
is in part whether the rules properly interpret the statute. Rules issued
under such a provision have some earmarks of interpretative rules and
some earmarks of legislative rules; the theoretical distinction loses much
of its practical utility.
Not merely in the borderland is the theory weak. The conception
that interpretative rules do not embody new law but merely interpret
previous law seldom accords with reality. Here as elsewhere the process
of interpretation necessarily involves the creation of new law. A ready
example is Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, which contains
a one-sentence definition of "income," partly in terms of itself. The
regulations supposedly interpreting this sentence contain detailed pro-
visions concerning such subjects as sale of patents, annuities and insur-
ance policies, discharge in bankruptcy, sale and purchase by a corpora-
tion of its own bonds. To say that such regulations "interpret" the
statute is artificial; the regulations go far beyond the statute. The regu-
lations draw not merely from the conventional materials of interpreta-
tion but from administrative experience, from policy considerations,
and from court decisions. Pursuing Section 22(a) one step further leads
to a spectacular example showing how law which is theoretically statu-
tory interpretation may grow through the interaction of interpretative
regulations and court decisions.
In 1945 the Treasury added the "Clifford" regulations to its regula-
tions under Section 22(a). 64 The Supreme Court had held in the Clifford
case of 1940 that a grantor was taxable on income of a five-yeartrust
where the grantor had broad powers of management and the beneficiary
was the grantor's wife. 5 The Court made clear that the result rested
upon the combination of three factors, the short term, the control, and
the immediate relationship of the beneficiary. The Clifford decision
flooded the tax tribunals with cases involving variations of its facts,
leading to what the Treasury regulation calls "considerable uncertainty
and confusion." And the new Treasury regulations can hardly be called
an attempted codification of the judicial decisions-far from it. The
regulations disregard one of the three key elements of the Clifford case:
whether or not the beneficiary is a member of the grantor's immediate
family. The regulations abandon the idea that the various factors must
the Administrator's regulations under this provision invalid in Addison Y. Holly Hill
Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U. S. 607 (1944). None of the three opinions in this case
labels the regulations as interpretative or as legislative, but the majority says: "It is not
for us to write a definition. That is the Administrator's duty." Id. at 619. This seems to
indicate that the Court deemed the regulations to be legislative. Yet the Court held that
the regulations to be framed to replace the invalid ones would be retroactive. See the dis-
cussion of the retroactive feature, p. 946 infra.
64. T.D. 5488 (1945), amended 1947, Regs. 111, 29.22 (a)-21.
65. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940).
19481
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
be considered in combination. The regulations substitute precise tests
for vague ones. Instead of pretending that the regulations are merely
interpretations of previous law, the Treasury, by limiting the regula-
tions to prospective operation, recognizes that the regulations do change
the law. That the regulations are intended to be merely interpretative
along with the bulk of other tax regulations seems beyond doubt, Yet
they are clearly designed to make bold and abrupt changes in the law.
The theory of interpretative rules is in this instance out of step with
the practical realities.
The theoretical distinction between legislative and interpretative
rules is imperfect, frequently without practical utility, and partially
false. Yet that distinction, with all its faults, is the foundation for a
large amount of living law. Probably no sensible issue can be drawn
concerning the acceptance or rejection of the theoretical distinction.
But the case law and the practices of the agencies can be gradually
molded to get rid of the misconception that what is theoretically inter-
pretation never involves the creation of new law.
III. FACTORS WHICH VARY THE AUTHORITATIVE WEIGHT Or
INTERPRETATIVE RULES AND PRAcTIcEs
The supposition is common that legislative rules have the force of
law and that interpretative rules do not. Much more accurate is the
statement that legislative rules have the force of law 11 and that inter-
pretative rules sometimes do. To be still more precise, we must depart
from the uncertain concept of "force of law." Courts frequently give as
much effect to interpretative rules as to legislative rules, and courts
frequently find ways to set aside legislative rules. The idea of "force of
law" ignores many refinements; an unappealed decision of a lower court
has the force of law in its effect upon immediate parties but is only of
some persuasive weight in another court. Even a decision of the highest
court lacks force of law to the extent that an overruling may be retro-
active. Meticulous analysis must avoid the dichotomy depending on
force of law. A more significant inquiry is into degrees of authoritative
weight. /Legislative rules normally have greater authoritative weight
than interpretative rules, but the authoritative weight of interpretative
rules varies considerably. Courts are not supposed to substitute their
their judgment as to content of legislative rules, but although courts
are free to substitute their judgment as to content of interpretative
rules they often refrain in varying degrees from doing so.
Degrees of authoritative weight of interpretative rules may depend
upon such factors as the extent of judicial confidence in the particular
agency and the relative skills of administrators and judges in handling
66. Assuming of course that the rules are promulgated in accordance with proper
procedure and that they are within constitutional and statutory authority.
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th' particular subject matter. A complex interpretative rule relating
to electrical interference which the FCC's engineers can best handle
does not invite substitution of judicial judgment. Just as "perplexities,
both geological and economic," 67 have impelled the Supreme Court to
emphasize judicial self-restraint in a context of due process, so perplex-
ities in any non-judicial field encourage judicial self-restraint in any
context. At the other extreme are interpretative regulations dealing
with questions on which judges are the experts. A good example is
the Wage and Hour Division's Interpretative. Bulletin dealing vth
coverage, depending upon limits of congressional power under the com-
merce clause and upon the meaning of such statutory phrases as "pro-
duction of goods for commerce." Here it is hardly surprising to find
courts reaching conclusions at variance with interpretative regulations,
even without mentioning the regulations.S Probably most tax regula-
tions lie between these extremes, and judges are free to give any degree
of authoritative weight to the Treasury's views. One commentator
regards the interpretative regulations as "the Treasury's guess as to
what the law means," having "no more legal effect than the taxpay-
er's." 69 If this remark ever did reflect prevailing attitudes, which is
doubtful, the recent tendency is to regard Treasury regulations with
much greater respect 7 Another writer has made an exceedingly persua-
sive argument for the proposition that interpretative tax regulations
should prevail "in the absence of a clear showing of error." 71 This
proposition probably does not yet embody existing practice, but the
movement in the tax field is in this direction.
67. Railroad Commission v. Royan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U. S. 570, 574 (1941).
68. 10 East Fortieth St. Bldg., Inc. v. Callus, 325 U.S. 578 (1945); Chapman v.
Home Ice Co., 136 F.2d 353 (C.C.A. 6th 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 761 (1943) ; Ham-
let Ice Co. v. Fleming, 127 F.2d 165 (C.C.A. 4th 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 634
(1942). The last two cases hold that supplying ice within a state to refrigerator cars on
interstate trains is producing goods for commerce. The opinions do not mention the
Interpretative Bulletin to the contrary. The Commissioner later changed the Bulletin to
conform to the decisions, but the change wras limited to prospective effect after April 15,
1945.
69. Alvord, Treasury Regulations and the Wil4hire Oil Case, 40 Cor. I. RL-v. 252
261 (1940). A good example of a case in which the Supreme Court seems to have adopted
this view is Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 6S S.Ct. 695 (1948), where the
Court said: "This Court has many times declared that Treasury regulations must he
sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent ivth the revenue statutes... r
Id. at 698. The Court then discussed the statute, the legislative history, and the practice,
and concluded: "We find nothing unreasonable in the regulations here." Id. at 700. The
case of course does not mean that the Court will not in the future substitute its judgment
for that of the Treasury in regulations whenever the Court's disagreement is strong enough.
70. Textile Mills Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U. S. 326, 338-9 (1941) ; Magruder v.
Washington B. & A. . Corp., 316 U.S. 69, 73-4 (1942) ; Merchants Nat. Bank v. Com-
missioner, 320 U.S. 256, 260 (1943).
71. Eisenstein, Sotw Ico)wclastic Reflections oi Tax Admniiistration, 53 HAnv. L
REv. 477, 528 (1945).
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Apart from such broad considerations, the weight given to interpre-
tative rules depends upon various special circumstances.72 Courts tend
to give extra weight, often approximating "force of law," in various
situations, three of the most important being: (1) when the administra-
tive interpretation was made contemporaneously with the enactment of
the statute by those who may have been familiar with the legislative
intent, (2) when the administrative interpretation is of long standing,
and (3) when the statute has been reenacted. These and other factors
appear in the cases in nearly all possible combinations; they are sepa-
rated here only for convenience of discussion.
(1) Contemporaneous construction. As early as 1827, interpreting a
North Carolina statute of 1782, the Supreme Court declared: "In the
construction of a doubtful and ambiguous law, the contemporaneous
construction of those who were called upon to act under the law, and
were appointed to carry, its provisions into effect, is entitled to very
great respect." 71 Cases thus giving weight to contemporaneous con-
struction are legion. 74 A reliable modem statement is that of Mr. Jus-
tice Cardozo in Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States: 7 "Adminis-
trative practice, consistent and generally unchallenged, will not be
72. One interesting special circumstance involves the agency's interpretations of its
own legislative rules. Unless a rule-making procedure is followed and the rule specifically
amended, an administrative interpretation of a rule, even if published as the controlling
interpretation, is probably interpretative. But the science of interpretation of administra-
tive rules-both administrative interpretation and judicial interpretation-is still in its
infancy. An outstanding recent case is Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U, S.
410 (1945), in which the question was how to interpret an OPA Price Regulation. The
Court said: "The ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of
controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. ...
Our only tools ...are the plain words of the regulation and any relevant interpretations
of the Administrator." Another view, which in an appropriate case is very likely to get
approval of the Supreme Court, is expressed by a lower court in Southern Goods Corp.
v. Bowles, 158 F.2d 587, 590 (C.C.A. 4th 1946) : "It would be absurd to hold that the
courts must subordinate their judgment as to the meaning of a statute or regulation to
the mere unsupported opinion of associate counsel in an administrative department."
Here as elsewhere, judges' views of the merits of particular -cases are likely to govern
choices among competing theories concerning degrees of judicial intervention, Compare
Fleming v. Van Der Loo, 160 F.2d 906 (App. D. C. 1947), with Mechanical Farm Eq,
Distributors v. Porter, 156 F.2d 296 (C.C.A. 9th 1946).
For a thorough and comprehensive treatment of this increasingly important subject,
see Newman, How Courts Interpret Regulations, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 509 (1947).
73. Edward's Lessee v. Darby, 12 Wheat. 206, 210 (U.S. 1827).
74. Magruder v. Washington B. & A. Corp., 316 U. S. 69, 73 (1942) ; United States
v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 549 (1940) ; National Lead Co.
v. United States, 252 U. S. 140, 145 (1920) ; United States v. Hill, 120 U. S. 169, 182
(1887). Typical is the language of Hassett v. Welch, 303 U. S. 303, 310-11 (1938). But
see, rejecting the contemporaneous construction, Trust of Bingham v, Commissioner, 325
U. S. 365 (1945).
75. 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933).
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overturned except for very cogent reasons if the scope of the command
is indefinite and doubtful. . . .The practice has peculiar weight when
it involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men
charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of
making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet un-
tried and new."
One of the most revealing cases is White v. Winchester Country Club.
The question was whether certain payments to a club were taxable.
The Treasury's contemporaneous regulations.provided they were. Six
years later a district court held they were not. "During a period" after
that decision the Treasury complied with it. Congress then reenacted
the statute in the same terms. The Supreme Court said that the Treas-
ury's revision of the regulation was not voluntary but was dictated
by the district court, that the reenactment did not adopt the district
court's decision since one decision does not approach the dignity of a
well-settled interpretation, and that "substantially contemporaneous
expressions of opinion are highly relevant and material evidence of the
probably general understanding of the times and of the opinions of
men who probably were active in drafting the statute." 7 Yet the
Court's holding does not stand for the proposition that contempora-
neous administrative construction will be given more weight than a
statutory reenactment while a different administrative practice pre-
vails, for the Court's own views as to the merits necessarily played a
part.
An additional reason for giving extra authoritative weight to con-
temporaneous interpretations is that judicial decisions usually lag so
far behind administrative practices that business may long be trans-
acted in reliance upon administrative interpretations. 8
Two limitations on giving extra weight to contemporaneous construc-
tion have been suggested. 9 First, the administrators may or may not
have participated in the framing of the legislation; when they have not,
contemporaneous construction may deserve less weight. Secondly, the
framework for administrative activities in dynamic fields ought not to
be frozen, but the agency should have freedom to try to achieve general
legislative objectives by taking into account later developments and
later experience.80
76. 315 U.S. 32 (1942).
77. Id. at 41.
78. See Griswold, A Stuniary of the Regulations Probln, 54 H.av. L. RLv. 393,
406-7 (1941).
79. See Feller, Addendum to the Regulations Problem, 54 HAnv. L. RE:v. 1311,
1319-20 (1941).
80. An. outstanding exemplification of this view is the holding of the majority in
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
A possible third limitation may flow from such considerations as are suggested by
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(2) Interpretations of long standing. Courts give extra authoritative
weight to interpretative rules and practices consistently followed over
a long period. Thus, in upholding regulations, the Supreme Court has
stressed that "these regulations .. .have been in force for a period of
more than eighteen years, with the silent acquiescence of Congress." 81
Emphasis on this element has its roots in the last century 2 More
recently the Supreme Court has often overstated the effect given to
long-standing rules: "Treasury regulations and interpretations long
continued without substantial change, applying to unamended or sub-
stantially re-enacted statutes, are deemed to have received congres-
sional approval and have the effect of law." 83 Language like this is
common when administrative interpretations are otherwise amply sup-
ported, but courts seldom give the effect of law to administrative inter-
pretations with which they disagree. In Koshland v. Helvering 11 the
Supreme Court nullified a regulation which had been uniformly ac-
cepted as law for sixteen years, even though the reasons for respecting
long-standing regulations were present in their strongest combination-
the need for predictability, the widespread reliance on the customary
practice, the harshness of upsetting retroactively the accepted law.
Similarly, although the Bureau of Internal Revenue since 1939 and the
Social Security Board since 1942 had refused to treat back pay awarded
under the National Labor Relations Act as "wages" within the mean-
ing of the Social Security Act, the Supreme Court in 1946 overturned
the long-standing practice, because "the Board's interpretation of this
statute to exclude back pay goes beyond the boundaries of administra-
tive routine and the statutory limits. This is a ruling which excluded
from the ambit of the Social Security Act payments which we think
were included by Congress. It is beyond the permissible limits of ad-
the following: A former employee of the Treasury Department, testifying before a Senate
Committee in 1924, said that the Bureau of Internal Revenue "had a progressive policy
which it followed in interpreting the law, a policy of progressing from conservatism to
liberalism. Regulations were harsh, he said, under the new law in order to discourage
excessive claims for amortization, but later weri amended to favor the taxpayer. Ile
claimed that to interpret the law so as to favor the government and to permit a modifica-
tion later if the taxpayers could prove that the original interpretation was incorrect was
the proper course for tax official to follow." CoMER, LEoisLTvE Fulicrios oF NA-
TioNAL ADMmsTRwm AuTnorsms 142-3 (1927). Compare 1 MRTEs, LAw ov
FEDERAiL INCOME TAXATIoN 88 (1942): "The Treasury Department's interest is in rev-
enue and naturally its regulations would be favorable to its maintenance rather than
judicially impartially balanced."
81. United States v. Shreveport G. & E. Co., 287 U.S. 77, 84 (1932). The Court also
relied on the contemporaneousness of the regulations.
82. E.g., Smythe v. Fiske, 90 U.S. 374, 382 (1874).
83. Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938), quoted with approval it Boehm
v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 287, 292 (1945), and paraphrased in Commissioner v. Flowers,
326 U.S. 465, 469 (1946).
84. 298 U.S. 441 (1936).
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ministrative interpretation." 81 When cases both ways are read together
the conclusion emerges that long-followed regulations or practices are
often given extra authoritative weight but do not necessarily have the
effect of law. 6
(3) Reenactment. Many Supreme Court opinions, early and late, say
that reenactment of a statute is an implied legislative approval of ad-ministrative interpretations which may give the interpretations the
force of law. In 1908 the Supreme Court asserted that "the reenactment
by Congress, without change, of a statute, which had previously re-
ceived long continued executive construction, is an adoption by Con-
gress of such construction." 87 This doctrine has been stated, restated
and applied in a long line of cases.83 The doctrine has been enxtensively
criticized, 9 but the Supreme Court persists in declaring that an inter-
pretation after a reenactment "is deemed to possess implied legislative
approval and to have the effect of law." 11 Since the doctrine has played
a part in only a few cases outside the tax field,9 ' the doctrine's role in
tax cases is most instructive.
Despite the Supreme Court's continued propensity for unqualified
statement of the doctrine, cases refusing to apply it indicate qualifica-
tions. When the Court thinks statutory language requires a different
interpretation it rejects the reenactment doctrine: "Where the law is
plain the subsequent reenactment of a statute does not constitute the
adoption of its administrative construction." 92 Even when the statute
is seemingly colorless, the Court may reject the reenactment rule when
its policy views are sufficiently strong."3 And when the administrative
85. Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369-70 (1946).
86. An entirely reliable statement is that of Mr. Justice Jackson in Skidmore v. Svift
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944), concerning an interpretative bulletin of the Wage and
Hour Division, quoted mipra at pp. 930-31.
87. United States v. Cerecedo Hermanos, 209 U.S. 337, 339 (1903), relying upon
United States v. Falk, 204 U.S. 143, 152 (1907), where the Court said that an interpreta-
tion by the Attorney General which had been followed by executive officers was "adopted"
by Congress by reenactment.
88. E.g., United States v. Dakota-Montana Oil Co., 288 U.S. 459, 466 (1933): "The
administrative construction must be deemed to have received legislative approval by the
reenactment of the statutory provision, without material change." Sec Helvering v. R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 115 (1939) : 'Under the established rule Congress
must be taken to have approved the administrative construction and thereby to have given
it the force of law."
89. See references in note 100, infra.
90. Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 469 (1946). See also Crane v. Commis-
sioner, 331 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947); Boehm v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 287, 292 (1946).
91. E.g., New York, N.I. & H. R.R. v. ICC, 200 U.S. 361, 401-2 (1906) ; Louisville
& N.R.R. v. United States, 232 U.S. 740, 757 (1931).
92. Biddle v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 573, 582 (1938).
93. This seems rather clearly to be true of Koshland v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 441
(1936), despite the Court's statement that "where, as in this case, the provisions of
the act are unambiguous, and its directions specific, there is no power to amend it by
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interpretation has lacked clarity 14 or consistency 11 the reenactment
doctrine is inapplicable. Contemporaneous construction has been held
more weighty in one set of circumstances than a reenactment.?0 Fur-
thermore, whenever, instead of mechanically reciting the reenactment
doctrine to bolster a result reached largely on other grounds, the Court
has come to grips with the doctrine, its limited character has often been
recognized in explicit terms.97 The Court has even meekly acknowl-
edged that the reenactment rule "has been stated in various and not
entirely consistent terms.' '9 8 The most reliable observation is that the
reenactment rule "is no more than an aid in statutory construction." 11
What weight, if any, a court should give to statutory reenactment is
a problem of many facets. An unusually fine flurry of law review articles
has led to conflicting conclusions.' A crucial factor is whether or not
regulation." Id. at 447. Realistically, the question was not whether the statute was am-
biguous or unambiguous, for the statute was silent; what was being interpreted was not so
much the statute as an earlier decision of the Supreme Court. That the Treasury interpreta-
tion was a reasonable one seems to be shown by the view of the dissenting Justices and by
decisions of other courts.
94. E.g., Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 49 (1939) ; "At most the
regulation is ambiguous and without persuasive force in determining the true construction
of the statute."
95. E.g., Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 389, 398 (1940).
96. White v. Winchester Country Club, 315 U.S. 32 (1942). But in other circum-
stances reenactment might be more persuasive than contemporaneous construction.
97. Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90, 101 (1939).
98. Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 396 (1943). The Court in a long footnote
quotes inconsistent excerpts from former opinions. For a more extended discussion of
variations in judicial language, see Walker v. United States, 83 F.2d 103, 106-7 (C.C.A.
7th 1936).
99. Helvering v. Reynolds, 313 U.S. 428 (1941). This decision seemingly recognized
the unsoundness of the earlier decision in Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306
U.S. 110 (1939). But unfortunately the Court more recently has reverted to its earlier
unqualified statements.
100. Mr. Griswold advances the view that "the mere reenactment of a statute follow-
ing administrative construction should be given no weight whatever in determining the
proper construction of the statute." Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem,
54 HA av. L. REv. 398, 400 (1941). Mr. Feller concludes: "What I suggest is an applica-
tion of the reenactment rule with varying degrees of light and shade depending on the
circumstances of reenactment. In no event do I urge the extreme 'force of law' formula-
tion of the rule . . ." Feller, Addendum to the Regulations Problem, 54 HARv. L. REv.
1311, 1318 (1941). Mr. Paul says that "though one may denounce the reasoning of the
doctrine as a mockery of the facts, one may yet applaud many of its results. . . . Ap-
plied as a persuasive but not a conclusive factor the principle promotes an increased de-
gree of predictability . . . [and] may on occasion accomplish a desirable result in adding
stability to regulations upon which taxpayers are forced to rely." PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDIMAL
TAXATION, 420, 429-30 (3d Series, 1940) (But if such additional stability is desirable, it
ought to attach to all regulations irrespective of the fortuitous and sometimes irrelevant
element of reenactment.). Compare Eisenstein, Some Iconoclastic Reflections on Tax Ad.
ministration, 58 HAMv. L. REV. 477 (1945) (arguing that all interpretative tax regulations
should be upheld unless clearly wrong). Mr. Surrey rejects the reenactment doctrine,
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Congress or some part of it has deliberately decided not to change the
administrative interpretation. Mr. Randolph Paul reminds us that the
reenactment rule presumes "that Congress, each time it passes a reve-
nue act, has omniscience as to all outstanding regulations and judicial
decisions and that it will be thoroughly diligent to correct by legislation
any interpretation with which it disagrees. There follows the thought
that inaction is action in that a failure to legislate implies an agreement
with all outstanding regulations, without any apparent distinction as
to their interpretative or legislative character. Anyone cognizant of the
processes and exigencies of tax legislation is perfectly familiar with the
simple fact that any such presumption is not only artificial, but in large
part unfounded." 101 Whenever a congressional awareness of the ad-
ministrative interpretation does not appear and seems unlikely, the
basis for the reenactment rule vanishes.
Even when some reason appears for surmising that someone in the
legislative process has considered the administrative interpretation,
such as when a congressional committee has made an unusually compre-
hensive study, the crucial difference.between approval and failure to
disapprove must be recognized. Failure to disapprove may reflect no
more than willingness to leave details to special skills of administrators
and judges. 10 2 Congress normally limits itself to the basic framework,
dealing with relative detail only when special need arises. The reason
for administrative power to issue regulations is that the administrative
process is better equipped than the cumbersome legislative machinery
to handle a tremendous riass of relative minutia. To say that Congress
by reenactment approves detailed interpretations is to defeat the pur-
pose of Congress in unloading the administrative burden onto the
Treasury, even though affirmative indication appears that some con-
sideration was given to the administrative interpretation. In the words
except when actual approval by Congress is shown. Surrey, Thc Scope ard Effect of
Treasury Regulations, 88 U. oF PA. L. REv. 556 (1940). 'Air. Brown thinks reenactment
should be given weight but should not be conclusive. Brown, Regulations, Reenachnent,
and the Revenue Acts, 54 HARv. L. Rnv. 377 (1941). Mr. Alvord takes the extreme view
that reenactment freezes an administrative interpretation even to such an extent that the
administrative authority cannot change it. Alvord, Trcasury Regulations and the Wilshire
Oil Case, 40 Co.. L. Rav. 252, 265 (1940).
101. PAUL, Svunsas ix FEDRA. TAxATiox, 420, 426-7 (3d Series, 1940). Looting
at the problem from another angle may throw better light: "If Congress gave thought
to the matter, the natural question would be: 'Will we dare in the future to enact a
comprehensive revenue act without a complete study of the regulations issued by the
Commissioner?" Id. at 420.
102. The statute involved in Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110
(1939) was reenacted after regulations were issued and then reenacted after the regula-
tions had been changed. According to the theory of the reenactment rule, Congress ap-
proved both the unamended regulations and the amended regulations; under the un-
qualifed rule both had the force of law. Similarly, when a regulation is one way and a
court decision is the other way, the theory is that Congress approves both-an absurdity.
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of Judge Learned Hand, "To suppose that Congress must particularly
correct each mistaken construction under penalty of incorporating it
into the fabric of the statute appears to us unwarranted; our fiscal legis-
lation is detailed and specific enough already." "I And so, failure of
Congress to disapprove may be a far cry from approval. Yet failure to
disapprove may still sometimes deserve some weight. 14 The weight
should perhaps vary with the degree of probability that Congress might
have changed the administrative practice if a different construction had
been preferred; the degree of probability may never be measurable, but
circumstances may permit a fair guess.'
Of course, the reenactment problem must depend in part upon other
factors in a particular case. When other factors are about in equilib-
rium, the reenactment rule may conceivably be decisive.' But no set of
reenactment circumstances is likely to divert the Supreme Court from
giving effect to a deep conviction concerning policy. An extreme ex-
ample is a case much celebrated for other reasons, Helvering v. Clif-
ford.' Congress had specifically considered the administrative inter-
pretation and a Treasury proposal for change, but had reenacted the
statute without change; 10 a stronger case for applying the reenactment
103. F. W. Woolworth Co. v. United States, 91 F2d 973, 970 (C.C.A. 2d 1937),
cert. denied 302 U. S. 768 (1938).
104. It is of course arguable that an interpretation which is not specifically considered
by Congress in reenacting the statute is approved on the ground that if the interpretation
were clearly at variance with the will of Congress the interpretation would have been
considered. But such a line of reasoning is not only speculative but unreal.
105. One may easily surmise that Congress would have changed the administrative
practice if Congress had disapproved "the industry earnings and product pricing stand-
ards" used by the Administrator in Gillespie-Rogers-Pyatt Co. v. Bowles, 144 F2d 361
(Enm. Ct. App. 1944). The standards were of sufficient importance to justify congressional
action, and the legislative history specifically showed a congressional understanding of the
standards. The price-ceiling order, of course, was legislative, not interpretative; yet the
court leaned on the reenactment doctrine in upholding the order. This seems to be an in-
stance of an entirely sound reliance on the reenactment doctrine.
106. E.g., United States v. Dakota-Montana Oil Co., 288 U. S. 459, 466 (1933);
Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U. S. 79, 83 (1938).
Compare PAuL, STuDiEs ix FEDERAL TAXATION, 420, 425 (3d Series, 1940), who
catalogs the various forms of statement of the reenactment rule and observes: "These
degrees of verbal rhetoric, however, merely clutter up the interpretative problem, and
could be abolished from the judicial lexicon with little loss; it is most unlikely that any
actual judgment in many cases would have been different if the court had started out
with exactly the opposite formula."
107. 309 U.S. 331 (1940). See discussion pp. 933-4 supra.
108. Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on HR. 7835, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 151 (1934) ; Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 HARv. L. RnV.
398, 403-4 (1941). Perhaps it is arguable that what Congress rejected was the proposal
to tax short-term trusts, not a proposal to tax where three factors come together, one of
which is the short term of the trust.
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rule seldom occurs." 9 Yet the Supreme Court adopted the view Con-
gress had rejected1."0
An incidental problem is whether the reenactment rule applies not
only to interpretative rules but also to legislative rules. One commenta-
tor has argued that it does not: "It would seem clear, though, that
reenactment must be immaterial as to the validity of a legislatze regu-
lation. Either the regulation is within the authority delegated by Con-
gress, or it is not. If it is within the delegated power, there is no question
of a proper construction of the statute or of actual legislative intent,
and reenactment is not necessary. If it is beyond the delegated power,
then, under even the strongest formulation of the reenactment rule, no
amount of reenactment can help it." "I The weakness of this either-
or analysis is that each of its two parts starts with the assumption that
the regulation is either valid or invalid, whereas in many cases that is
the problem to be solved. When the question is whether legislative
regulations go beyond the agency's power, a statutory reenactment may
in some circumstances constitute an approval or a failure to disapprove
the exercise of the power. To the extent that the reenactment doctrine
has validity for interpretative rules and practices, it should probably
apply equally to the question whether legislative rules are within statu-
tory authority. And the Supreme Court apparently has so held.112
109. A stronger case might be the situation brought out by Feller, Addcdu, to the
Regidations Problem, 54 HARv. L. REv. 1311, 1316 (1941): "Where an agency construes
its powers a's covering a particular class of expenditure and Congress thereafter appropri-
ates money under the same general description, it has been held that the new appropria-
tion constitutes congressional ratification of the validity of the original expenditure."
Alabama Pwr. Co. v. Ickes, 64 Wash. L. Rep. 563 (D.C. Supr. Ct. 1936), aff'd or. othcr
grouids, 302 U.S. 464 (1938). This idea has been one of the main props for many war
agencies created by executive action.
110. In fields other than taxation the Supreme Court has often brought about results
which bills rejected by Congress sought to produce. E.g., Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324
U.S. 244 (1945); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 3M6 (1945), recon-
sidered and clarified, 324 U.S. 570 (1945).
111. Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problemn, 54 HAnv. L. Rzv. 393, 401
(1941). The same view is expressed in Alvord, Treasury Regulation and the Milshre
Oil Case, 40 Co. L. REv. 252, 262 (1940) : The reenactment doctrine obviously "has no
proper application to legislative regulations. Validly promulgated legislative regulations
speak with the force of the statute itself. There is no necessity for legislative adoption"
This reasoning may be unsound in that it assumes validity when validity is the question
at issue. Reenactment may tend to confirm a doubtful exercise of power to promulgate
particular regulations.
112. In Douglas v. Commissioner, 322 U.S. 275 (1944), the Court was dealing vith
depletion regulations issued under a grant of power in section 23(m) of the Internal
Revenue Code. The Court said: "As Congress obviously could not foresee the multi-
farious circumstances which would involve questions of depletion, it delegated to the
Commissioner the duty of making the regulations.... Congress has enacted numerous
revenue acts since that time and has seen no occasion to change the statutory delegation
of authority to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue which is the basis of this long-
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IV. RETROACTIVE RULES
Retroactive rules involve all the difficulties of retroactive statutes,
complicated by the subordinate position of the agency, by the theoreti-
cal distinction between legislative and interpretative rules, and by the
various doctrines concerning the authoritative weight of interpretative
rules.
Retroactive statutes are often upheld. The constitutional prohibi-
tion of ex post facto laws has always been limited to criminal law and
has never applied to civil legislation or regulations."' Due process
prevents retroactive legislation deemed unreasonable.1 1 4 Yet retroac-
tive legislation is often reasonable and valid."' For instance, the Su-
preme Court has upheld a 1935 statute taxing income received in
1933,1"1 a statute providing for deportation of aliens on account of acts
committed before the enactment of the statute," 7 a legislative exten-
sion of a statutory period of limitation which had already run," 8 a
statutory withdrawal of a vested right to a tax refund,"' and a legisla-
tive ratification of tax 6ollections admittedly illegal when made.'
standing regulation. This evidences that [the regulations] are within the rule-making
authority which was intended to be granted the Commissioner." Id. at 281-2. The Court
was not explicit in regarding the regulations as legislative.
In ,Gillespie-Rogers-Pyatt Co. v. Bowles, 144 F.2d 361 (Em. Ct. App. 1944) the
court relied in part upon the reenactment doctrine in upholding the validity of a price-
ceiling order. The specific legislative history showed a clear congressional understanding
of the principles the Administrator was applying. The order was of course legislative, not
merely interpretative.
113. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (U.S. 1798). The case upheld a legislative enactment
granting a new trial after the time for applying for a new trial had expired.
114. Before the adoption of the 14th Amendment, nothing in the Federal Constitution
prevented retroactive legislation. See Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. 380, 412 (1829) :
"Retrospective laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts or partake of the
character of ex post facto laws are not condemned or forbidden by any part of the con-
stitution." See also Baltimore & S. R. R. v. Nesbit, 51 U.S, 395, 401 (1850).
115. See Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vbsted Rights, 5 Tnx. L. Rav. 231 (1927),
6 TEx. L. REv. 409 (1928) ; Shulman, Retroactive Legislation in 13 ExcYc. Soc. Sc. 355
(1934) ; Stimson, Retroactive Application of Law, 33 Micii. L. REV. 30 (1939).
116. Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938). The Court generalized: "A tax is not
necessarily unconstitutional because retroactive . . . It is but a way of apportioning the
cost of government among those who in some medsure are privileged to enjoy its benefits
and must bear its burdens." Id. at 146.
117. Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924).
118. Chase Securities Corporation v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945), following the
great leading case to the same effect, Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885) ; accord,
Paramino Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 309 U.S. 370 (1940).
119. Graham v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409 (1931). The opinion contains a rather full
survey of the authorities.
120. United States v. Heinszen & Co., 206 U.S. 370 (1907); accord, People v. Title




Since legislative rules are merely the administrative counterpart of
statutes, the argument is plausible that legislative rules may be retro-
active whenever a statute may be retroactive, since the fairness or un-
fairness is the same and judicial ideas of fairness are decisive.1 21 But
agencies have no powers except those conferred and power to issue
retroactive rules is not easily implied. -1 2 2 And courts are more reluctant
to upset statutes than mere administrative regulations. Because retro-
activity is not favored, a reasonable initial view is that retroactive rules
should be tolerated only when specifically authorized by statute. Dean
Griswold has asserted that "as a matter of wise tax administration, the
Treasury should be held to have no power to amend a legislative regula-
tion retroactively." 123 This assertion embodies a splendid ideal which
will find general acceptance. But the ideal must be qualified to meet
the exigencies of administration both in the tax field and elsewhere.
The cases departing from the ideal invite special attention.
A good starting point is a tax decision of the Supreme Court. 124 The
statute provided that the basis of stock of a reorganized corporation
should be apportioned between old and new stock "under rules and
regulations prescribed by the Commissioner with the approval of the
Secretary." At the time of the reorganization and at the time the stock
was sold, the regulation provided that the portion of the basis of the
old shares attributed to the new stock should not exceed the value of
the new shares at the time of the distribution, but an amendment later
eliminated this limitation. The amendment operated to the taxpayer's
detriment. The Court upheld the retroactive application of the amend-
ment, on the ground that the original regulation was inconsistent with
the statute and that the amended regulation therefore "in effect became
the primary and controlling rule in respect of the situation presented.
It pointed the way, for the first time, for correctly applying the anteced-
ent statute to a situation which arose under the statute. . . . It is no
more retroactive in its operation than is a judicial determination con-
struing and applying a statute to a case in hand." 12 The intrinsic
situation probably compels retroactive creation of law. At the time of
121. The opinions often revolve around such conceptual distinctions as that between
vested and non-vested rights and that between rights and remedies, but at bottom each
decision depends on notions of fairness.
122. Cf. the view of three dissenting Justices in Addison v. Holly Hill Co., 322 U.S.
607, 640-1 (1944): 'If Congress intended the Administrator to act retroactively, Con-
gress wholly failed to express this purpose.. .. Seldom if ever... may administrative
or executive authority to apply it (the principle of retroactivity) be inferred from legis-
lation not expressly -giving it."
123. Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 HARv. L. Rnv. 393, 411
(1941).
124. Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 1'9 (193 5).
125. Id. at 135.
19481
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the taxable events, the only law on the point was the original regulation,
and that was invalid. The tax had to be computed. If no valid method
had been prescribed in advance, some method had to be formulated
afterwards, either judicially 12 or administratively.
Indeed, under a common form of statutory delegation, legislative
regulations must be initially retroactive. This is true whenever the
statute provides specified results but delegates power to prescribe de-
tails through legislative regulations. For instance, a statute becoming
effective in June may provide that a tax or a deduction shall be com-
puted in accordance with regulations to be prescribed by the Commis-
sioner with the approval of the Secretary, the taxable events may occur
in July, and the regulations may be published in September; no practi-
cal course is possible except to apply the regulations retroactively. 2 '
The Supreme Court has even affirmatively instructed an adminis-
trator to issue regulations and to give them retroactive effect.' The
Fair Labor Standards Act provides for exemption of employees "within
the area of production (as defined by the Administrator), engaged in
.. .canning of agricultural .. .commodities. . . ." The Adminis-
trator by regulation defined "area of production." The Supreme Court
held the regulation invalid. Then the Court faced the extraordinarily
difficult problem of the proper disposition of the case. It could (1) hold
the entire canning industry exempt irrespective of area of production,
(2) hold the entire canning industry subject to the Act irrespective of
area of production, (3) rewrite the regulation retroactively to make it
valid and to give new meaning to "area of production," (4) remand the
case to await the Administrator's preparation of a new regulation to be
applied retroactively, or (5) give effect for the past to the invalid regu-
lation as if it were valid. Either of the first two courses would clearly
defeat the intent of Congress; three dissenting Justices chose the second
course, thus favoring nullification of the exemption provided by the
Act.129 The third course would involve judicial usurpation of a power
given the Administrator, as well as retroactive creation of law; the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals and one Justice of the Supreme Court adopted
126. The Court might itself have created law retroactively in favor of the taxpayer
and thus have avoided the unfairness of retroactivity. But the Court would then (a) make
law inconsistent with what it found to be the legislative intent, and (b) assume a power
Congress gave to the administrative authorities.
127. Furthermore, the fact that judicial decisions interpreting statutes are usually
retroactive sometimes virtually forces retroactive changes in regulations, if the regula-
tions are to be kept consistent with judicial interpretations. This factor, of course, is
more important with respect to interpretative regulations than with respect to legislative
regulations.
128. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944).
129. Rutledge, Black, and Murphy, JJ., argued that the regulation was valid, and
that if it were invalid, then "clearly it exempts no one, petitioners are covered by the Act,
and the respondent must pay." Id. at 638. These three Justices vigorously condemned
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this view."0 The fourth would have the sole disadvantage of explicitly
requiring retroactive law making; the majority of the Court made this
choice."' The fifth is logically self-contradictory and has the practical
disadvantage of requiring judicial enforcement of a regulation specifi-
cally held invalid; yet the disadvantages of the fifth solution from a
practical standpoint may be the least, even though they are still very
real. 32 Congress in 1947 retroactively superseded the Supreme Court's
choice, providing a solution somewhat resembling the fifth course.'"
The statute provides that no employer shall be liable if he complied
either with the original invalid regulation or with the new regulation
retroactively applied. True, the congressional choice does not adversely
affect employers retroactively. But it does retroactively deprive em-
ployees of rights they had before enactment of the statute.13'
the retroactivity required by the majority. They did not specifically discuss the question
whether their solution involved retroactive law-making. Inasmuch as Congress dearly
intended to provide an exemption, and inismuch as the view of the dissenters would deny
the exemption for the past, it would seem that their view did involve retroactive law-
making.
130. Mr. Justice Roberts said: "I think the Administrator's order may well be al-
lowed to stand with the illegal and unauthorized feature of it deleted. This is what the
Circuit Court of Appeals decided and I believe it was right." Id. at 624. See Holly Hill
Fruit Products, Inc. v. Addison, 136 F2d 323 (C.C.A. 5th 1943).
131. The majority did not choose this solution because of its merit but because of the
greater demerit of other solutions: "To be sure this will be a retrospective judgment,
and law should avoid retroactivity as much as possible. But other possible dispositions
likewise involve retroactivity, with the added mischief of producing a result contrary to
the statutory design." Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 620
(1944). The three dissenters did not specifically answer this analysis.
132. The fifth comes as dose as any to avoiding retroactivity, and in a sense suc-
ceeds in doing so. The accepted legal theory is that the regulation was invalid all the
while, not that the Supreme Court's holding retroactively makes it so. If the theory is
realistic, the fifth solution would thus involve retroactivity. If it is more realistic to say
that the regulation was effective law until the Supreme Court held it invalid (thus de-
parting from traditional theory), then giving effect to the invalid regulation for the past
avoids retroactivity. See Comment, 35 CArw. L. Rzv. 92 (1947).
In Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301 (1935), the railroads had
charged increased rates pursuant to a Commission order which was later held invalid for
lack of adequate findings. The question was whether the railroads should be required to
make restitution of the increases that had been charged before a new and valid order
had reinstated the higher rates. The Court, five to four, denied restitution, thus giving
full effect to the invalid order. Since, however, the Commission issued a new order like
the old one, saying that the Court gave retroactive effect to the new order is just as
accurate.
Fixing rates retroactively is quite different in practical effect from fixing wages
retroactively under a statute which imposes double liability on the employer for deficiencies.
133. 61 STAr. 89 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. §261 (Supp. 1947). The provision is a part of
the Portal-to-Portal Act.
134. The House Committee said: "Congress has the power to provide protection to
employers who have complied in good faith with administrative regulation, interpreta-
tion, or enforcement practices." For this the Committee cited Graham v. Goodcell, 232
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All six solutions-the five available to the Court and the one Congress
chose-involve retroactive creation of law. Retroactivity is intrinsic
to the problem. When the problem is not whether law shall be made
retroactively but is what law shall be made retroactively, an observa-
tion that retroactive law-making is undesirable hardly contributes to
the solution. This melancholy conclusion may perhaps be softened by
a mellow reflection of Mr. Justice Cardozo: "Hardship must at times
result from postponement of the rule of action till a time when action
is complete. It is one of the consequences of the limitations of the
human intellect and of the denial to legislators and judges of infinite
prevision." 135
Retroactive legislative regulations may sometimes be desirable even
when circumstances permit limiting to prospective operation. When
trial-and-error techniques are appropriate, when hindsight is greatly
superior to prediction, when urgency requires action first and delibera-
tion afterwards, and when retroactivity involves no serious hardship,
the making of law may often properly follow the event. Orders fixing
rates or prices are often retroactive. A typical reparation order fixes
rates retroactively; the little ritual that a reparation order is "judicial"
.does not alter that plain fact. Since most railroad rates are fixed by
carriers, reparation orders retroactively fixing rates usually do not
change rulings of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The hard
problem arises when the Commission tries to change an earlier rate
order retroactively. This is the problem of the Arizona Grocery case,'
which denied to the Commission the power to award reparation for
shipments moving under rates the Commission had pieviously ap-
proved. The Court said that the Commission's order declaring a rate
reasonable "has the force of a statute" "I and that the Commission
"may not in a subsequent proceeding, acting in its quasi-judicial capac-
ity, ignore its own pronouncement promulgated in its quasi-legislative
capacity and retroactively repeal its own enactment as to the reason-
ableness of the rate it has prescribed." 138 The opinion was devoted to
logic and conceptualism-no effort was made to inquire into practical
advantages and disadvantages of retroactive changes in rate orders.
Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissented, emphasizing the experimental
character of rate making and arguing for "that flexibility of adaptation,
the maintenance of which is necessary to the life and growth of our
great and changing commerce." 139 When due weight is given such
U.S. 409 (1931) and Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). See H. R. Rnr. No.
71, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
135. CAInozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 145 (1921).
136. Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 284 U.S. 370 (1932).
137. Id. at 386.
138. Id. at 389.
139. This view was stated by Judge Hutcheson in Eagle Cotton Oil Co. v. Southern
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factors as the necessity for issuing orders in advance of full investigation,
the swiftness of economic changes, and the advantages of trial-and-
error methods, the reasonableness of adjusting rates after shipments
are made becomes apparent.'4 The Commission's opinions are persua-
sive that some play should be given to administrative discretion to
determine what orders should be retroactive and to what extent.1
41
Interprektive rules.
At the foundation of all problems of retroactive operation of inter-
pretative rules lies the discrepancy between the theory of interpretative
rules and what is often the reality. The theory is that since an inter-
pretative rule merely declares the meaning of previous law,142 such a
rule "is no more retroactive in its operation than is a judicial determina-
tion construing and applying a statute to a case in hand." 143 According
to the theory, an interpretative rule which does not express the true
meaning of the statute is necessarily a nullity, irrespective of a party's
reliance on the rule.144 Reliance cannot make an erroneous interpreta-
Ry., 51 F2d 443, 447 (C.C.A. 5th 1931), to which Justices Holmes and Brandeis referred.
140. The books are full of special ICC situations in which retroactive legislative orders
are upheld. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301 (1935), is outstanding.
In General Amer. Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado T. Co., 303 U.S. 42" (1940), the Court
held that a district court should keep on its docket a case involving reasonableness and
legality of practices with respect to car leases until the Commission could retroactively
determine that issue. The Court denied a petition for rehearing based on an argument
that retroactive determination was unfair. Accord, New York Edison Co. v. Maltlaie,
244 App. Div. 436, 279 N.Y.S. 949 (1935), aff'd 271 N.Y. 103, 2 N.E2d 277 (1936).
But cf. United States v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., 284 U.S. 195 (1931).
In the third Morgan case, United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183 (1939), the Court
held that funds impounded after the commencement of a rate-reduction proceeding should
be disposed of in accordance with an order of the Secretary to be issued in the future.
The result was to give the Secretary's order retroactive effect.
141. Some opinions are collected and discussed in 2 SzrA.tA., TnE L,'rasrAm
Comn-aRca Comsmsslox, 369 et seq. (1931). See also Note, 41 YArM L. J. 625 (1932).
An OPA price order has been applied retroactively to sales made thirteen months
before issuance of the order, where the reason for the order's lateness was the seller's
failure to make reports that the OPA needed to fix the ceiling. Porter v. Senderovitz,
158 F2d 435 (C.C.A. 3d 1946), cert. denied sub nom. Senderowitz v. Fleming, 330 U.S.
848 (1947). See also lMartini v. Porter, 157 F.2d 35 (C.C.A. 9th 1946), cert. dcr.ied
sub nom. Martini v. Fleming, 330 U.S. 848 (1947); Porter v. Kramer, 155 F.2d 687
(C.C.A. 8th 1946). But cf. Collins v. Fleming, 159 F.Zd 431 (Em. Ct. App. 1946), cert.
den ed, 330 U.S. 850 (1947).
142. See discussion p. 92 8 et seq. supra.
143. Manhattan Gen. E. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 124, 135 (1936). The
Court used this language even in dealing with a legislative regulation which had been
retroactively changed.
144. Judicial opinions are full of observations to this effect. An example: "The power
of an administrative officer or board to administer a federal statute and to prescribe rules
and regulations to that end is not the power to make law-for no such power can be
delegated by Congress-but the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will
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tion correct, for that would be to depart from the requirements of a
statute whose validity is not in question. Of course, when a court holds
an interpretative rule invalid, the agency is obligated (if the judicial
authority is high enough) 141 to conform its rule to the court's decision,
and the amendment must date from the enactment of the statute, for
the true and constant meaning of the statute is now known. Thus,
under the theory, agencies not only may but must apply retroactively
amendments occasioned by judicial decisions.
14"
If the theory is rigorously applied with blind logic, no question of
retroactive change in an interpretative rule can arise, for either the
change expresses the true meaning of the statute or it does not; if it
does, then that is what the statute has always meant and the law has
not been changed retroactively; if it does not, then the change is invalid
because inconsistent with the statute.
This theory, despite judicial lip service, is unreal and unsound. The
plain truth is that statutory interpretation frequently far transcends
the discovery of a meaning or a legislative intent. 4 ' Statutory inter-
pretation often involves creation of new law on questions which neither
the legislative body nor any committee nor any legislator nor any
draftsman anticipated, directly or indirectly. 4 Remembered only for
its gauche naivet6 is the serious assertion that the duty of a court in
interpreting the Constitution is "to lay the article of the Constitution
which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide
of Congress as expressed by the statute. A regulation which does not do this, but op.
erates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute, is a mere nullity." Manhattan
Gen. E. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936).
In Utah Hotel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 107 Utah 24, 151 P2d 467 (1944), the
hotel company had relied upon an administrative interpretation of an unemployment com-
pensation statute, but the court permitted a retroactive change in the interpretation. The
court recognized "that the hotel company is now in a position under which it will be
penalized for abiding by and relying upon the regulation or interpretation of the Depart-
ment.. ." The basis for the court's decision was the notion that an administrative in-
terpretation "is nothing more than an initial guess by the administrative tribunal as to
what the statute.., means .... An administrative interpretation out of harmony and
contrary to the express provisions of a statute cannot be given weight."
145. It is familiar practice for the Treasury to announce nonaciluiescence in decisions
of lower tribunals in tax cases.
146. This theory was so strong that an express statutory provision was deemed nec-
essary to allow the Treasury to limit changes in regulations to prospective operation.
Revenue Act (1921) § 1314, 42 STAT. 227, 314 (1921). Not until 1928 did the statute
allow such a limitation when the change was occasioned by a judicial decision. 45 STAT.
*791, 874 (1928). The present provision is § 3791(b) of the Internal Revenue Code.
147. See examples given pp. 932-4 supra.
148. An example with respect to which probably no reasonable mind would doubt the
truth of this observation is T.D. 5512 (May 1, 1946), amending sec. 81.17 of Regula-




whether the latter squares with the former." 141 In the sense of histori-
cal fact Congress did not "intend" the result reached by the Supreme
Court when it held that the Sherman Act should be applied to inter-
state insurance, 10 that the Norris-LaGuardia Act should affect the
criminal law,' 5 ' that a violator of the anti-trust laws should be required
to license patents at reasonable royalties,5 2 that the Wage and Hour
Division may prohibit industrial homework, 5 ' that retention by the
settlor of a trust of a remote reversionary interest makes the whole
trust property taxable as part of the settlor's estate,' that the Federal
Power Commission may radically depart from conventional methods
of rate fixing, 55 or that the Federal Communications Commission may
issue elaborate regulations governing the contractual relations between
broadcasting networks and local stations.' That the Supreme Court
in the name of statutory interpretation manufactures new law is a com-
monplace.
Most opinions, to be sure, speak the language of legislative "intent."
But judicial habits of speech cannot turn fiction into fact. Only occa-
sionally do judges throw out reminders of realism. In the second Ch-
nery case, 57 the majority of the Supreme Court did so. The Securities
and Exchange Commission, in approving a corporate reorganization,
required officers, directors and controlling stockholders to surrender at
cost plus dividends the preferred stock they had purchased, without
fraud and with full disclosure, during reorganization. In upholding the
order, the Court, instead of pretending that the Commission was apply-
ing pre-existing law embodied in the statute's broad terms, declared
frankly that the Commission was "announcing and applying a new
standard of conduct." 1's Mr. Justice Jackson in dissent said the Coin-
149. Mr. Justice Roberts in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
150. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assoc., 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
151. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
152. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U. S. 386 (1945), rcconsidcred and
clarified, 324 U.S. 570 (1945).
153. Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244 (1945).
154. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940); Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v.
Rothensies, 324 U.S. 10 (1945).
155. Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
156. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 19D (1943).
157. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). The first Chantry case, 318 U.S.
80 (1943) had set aside the same order because the legal analysis upon vhich it rested
was found deficient. On remand, the Commission stated new grounds and the case came
to the Supreme Court a second time.
158. Id. at 203. The Court was thus forced to ackmowledge that the result was retro-
active law-malting. The Court then said: "Every case of first impression has a retroac-
tive effect, whether the new principle is announced by a court or by an administrative
agency. But such retroactivity must be balanced against the mischief of producing a
result which is contrary to a statutory design or to legal and equitable principles. If that
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mission had exceeded its statutory authority and argued: "If what
these parties did really was condemned by 'statutory design' or 'legal
and equitable principles,' it could be stopped without resort to a new
rule and there would be no retroactivity to condone." "I9 This argument
is a quibble founded on a fiction-a fiction in which Mr. Justice Jackson
himself does not believe. Indeed, Mr. Justice Jackson spoke for the
majority in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lenroot, applying retroactively
the Court's interpretation of the statute but candidly acknowledging:
"Ascertainment of the intention of Congress in this situation is impos-
sible.It is to indulge in a fiction to say that it had a specific intention
on a point which never occurred to it." 110 The law would gain strength
from more of the Jackson view in the Western Union case and less of
.the Jackson view in the Chenery case.
Happily, the Supreme Court is more and more rejecting the theory
that interpretative rules involve no more than discovering a legislative
intent.'6 ' Thus, instead of purporting to find in the statute's broad
definition of income an answer to the question whether a corporation,
may realize a gain on sale of treasury stock, the Court said that the
statute ". . . is so general in its terms as to render an interpretative
regulation appropriate." 162 The Court has said that a depletion statute
was ". . . susceptible of various meanings and hence administrative
interpretation of it was peculiarly appropriate." 163 The Court has even
asserted that considerations extraneous to statutory words and legisla-
tive history may govern interpretative rules; under a provision for the
deduction of "ordinary and necessary" expenses, the interpretative
rules denied deduction of lobbying expenses, and the Court, referring
to the common-law policy against lobbying, said ". . .here is no rea-
son why, in absence of clear Congressional action to the contrary, the
rule-making authority cannot employ that general policy in drawing a
line between legitimate business expenses and those arising from that
family of contracts to which the law has given no sanction." 164
mischief is greater than the ill effect of the retroactive application of a new standard, it
is not the type of retroactivity which is condemned by law."
159. Id. at 214. In this opinion Mr. Justice Frankfurter joined. The opinion is other-
wise vehement, if not intemperate, since it characterizes what the majority approves as
"administrative authoritarianism" and "conscious lawlessness."
160. 323 U.S. 490, 508 (1945). See Radin, A Case Study in Statutory Interpretation:
Western Union v. Lenroot, 33 CALIF. L. Ray. 219 (1945).
161. More than a century ago the Supreme Court disapproved retroactive change in
administrative practices. Speaking of usages in the exercise of discretion in government
departments, the Court said: "No such change of such usages can have a retrospective
effect, but muft be limited to the future. Usage cannot alter thelaw, but it is evidence
of the construction given to it; and must be considered binding on past transactions,"
United States v. Macdaniel, 7 Pet. 1, 14-5 (U.S. 1833).
162. Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 114 (1939).
163. Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90, 102 (1939).
164. Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 339 (1941). Sec
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Whenever interpretative rules do in fact create new law, retroactive
law-making should be dealt with as such, unprejudiced by the false
notion that results never flow from the interpreter. Problems of retro-
activity then will be solved on the basis of ideas of fairness and the
necessities of practical administration.
Retroactive clarification of uncertain law ordinarily involves no un-
fairness. 165 It is retroactive change of settled law, not retroactive set-
tling of unsettled law, which may produce unjust results. This is why
interpretative rules issued after the enactment of a new statute may
normally speak as of the time of the statutory enactment.lc Retroac-
tively applying an original interpretation of an unclear statute is not
unfair.167 Similarly, if administrative and judicial decisions are incon-
sistent with interpretative rules, no injustice results from retroactively
changing the interpretative rules to clarify the confusion.CS New in-
further illustrations in Eisenstein, Some Iconoclastic Reflections on Tax Administration,
58 HARv. L. REv. 477, 529 et seq. (1945).
165. Of course, on the strictly substantive side, retroactive law-making v'aries con-
siderably. For instance, other factors being equal, retroactive creation of criminal law
or of the administrative counterpart of criminal law may be more objectionable than
retroactive creation of tax law. It is for this reason that statutory protection against
retroactive changes in rules is sometimes provided. An outstanding example is found in
the Securities Act of 1933: "No provision of this subchapter imposing any liability shall
apply to an act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any rule or regula-
tion of the Commission, notwithstanding that such rule or regulation may, after such act
or omission, be amended or rescinded or be determined by judicial or other authority to
be invalid for any reason." 48 STAT. 908 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77s (1940). On substantive
problems of retroactive law-making see Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights,
5 TEx. L. REv. 231 (1927), 6 Tsar. L. REv. 409 (1928).
166. It is assumed by Congress in I.-r. REv. Code § 3791(b). The Supreme Court so
held in Helvering v. Reynolds, 308 U.S. 428 (1941).
167. In Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 159 (1913) the Court specifically rejected a con-
tention that the defendant in a criminal case ,as denied due process because a doubtful
question of statutory construction -was decided for the first time in his case. In SEC v.
Chenery, 332 U.S. 194 (1947) the Court upheld "a new standard of conduct" which the
Commission had created and applied retroactively, theoretically interpreting the statute.
168. At this point, we depart slightly from Griswold, A Summary of the Regrduations
Problen, 54 HARv. L. REV. 398, 413 (1941). Air. Griswold lays down tw.o propositions:
"(1) An administrative interpretation should be freely amendable in the early or forma-
tive days of the regulation. (2) After the regulation has become seasoned, the Commis-
sioner should have no power to make retroactive amendments, at least against the in-
terest of the tax-payer." Sometimes regulations remain unamended for long periods but
case law grows up which conflicts with the regulations and conflicts with itself; when
this occurs a retroactive clarification through amended regulations (whether or not
occasioned by judicial decision) is not likely to be unfair. Compare Air. Justice Stone
for the Court in Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 52 (1939): "Adminis-
trative practice may be of persuasive weight in determining the construction of a statute
of doubtful meaning where the practice ... is not so inconsistent with applicable de-
cisions of the courts as to produce inconsistency and confusion in the administration of
the law." The regulations and practices in the Sanford case were certainly "seasoned.'
But the Court rejected them-retroactively. Then Congress in Ixr. REv. CoDz, § 100D(e),
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terpretative rules often may be changed retroactively without unfair-
ness, for parties should know that new regulations are frequently ex-
perimental.
Retroactive change in settled law may be unjust whether the change
is made by administrative action, by a court decision, or by an adminis-
trative amendment designed to conform to changes brought about by
judicial decisions. The common-law tradition to the contrary notvith-
standing, a retroactive change of settled law by judicial decision is just
as fair or unfair as a retroactive change of settled law in similar circum-
stances by administrative or legislative action. 63 Therefore changes in
settled law, whether by judicial decision or otherwise, frequently should
be limited to prospective operation. Courts have inherent power to
limit decisions to prospective operation, but they seldom do so."'
Administrative action so to limit the effect of judicial decisions often
becomes appropriate.' Since 1921 the Treasury has had authority
expressly conferred by statute to apply changes in regulations pros-
pectively only, except when the changes are occasioned by judicial
decisions, 172 and in 1928 the exception was eliminated. 13 Experience
proved the need for such power, and it has often been exercised. In
absence of express statutory authority to limit changes in regulations
as added by § 502 of the Act of 1943, 58 STAT. 71 (1944), 26 U.S.C. § 1000 (Supp. 1941-
1946), partially cured the retroactivity. See also Rasquin v. Humphreys, 308 U.S. 54
(1939).
169. The difference in tradition may be attributable mainly to the simple fact that
xetroactivity is intrinsic to the process of adjudicating cases on past facts. Furthermore,
with respect to the parties to the particular case, the court may weigh the harshness of
retroactivity against other considerations, whereas retroactive legislation normally pro-
vides no such cushioning. When retroactive rules are made by the same agency which
applies them to particular cases, an alert administration may at least theoretically pro-
vide the cushioning.
170. The Supreme Court has held that a court's refusal to apply to a particular case
the law the court believes to be right is not a denial of due process, when the court is
trying to avoid the undesirable effect of making a change retroactive. Great Northern
Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ry. Co., 287 U. S. 358 (1932).
171. An outstanding example is § 81.17 of Regulation 105, providing that in desig-
nated circumstances the tax otherwise applicable does not apply to transfers made be-
tween November 11, 1935, when the Supreme Court decided Helvering v. St. Louis Union
Trust Co., 296 U.S. 48, and January 29, 1940, when the Court decided Helvering v. Hal-
lock, 309 U.S. 106, which overruled the St. Louis Trust case. The Court itself did not
limit the Hallock decision to a prospective operation.
172. 42 STAT. 227, 314 (1921). This provision was retained in the Acts of 1924 and
1926.
173. 45 STAT. 791, 874 (1928). The present provision, § 3791(b) of the Internal Rev-
enue Code, provides: "The Secretary, or the Commissioner with the approval of the Sec-
retary, may prescribe the extent, if any, to which any ruling, regulation, or Treasury
Decision, relating to the internal revenue laws, shall be applied without retroactive ef-
fect." See the Court's account of the history of this provision in Helvering v. Griffiths,
318 U.S. 371, 397-9 (1943).
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to prospective effect, a power to make rules ought to be deemed suffi-
cient authority to impose such a limitation, even when the changes
result from judicial decisions. Thus, when courts held that the Fair
Labor Standards Act applied to activities which under an Interpretative
Bulletin of the Wage and Hour Administrator were beyond the scope
of the Act, the Administrator amended his Interpretative Bulletin to
comply with the decisions but expressly provided that the amendment
would apply only after a specified future date. 74
The reenactment doctrine plus a bit of logic may sometimes prevent
not only retroactive changes in interpretative rules, but even prospec-
tive changes in interpretative rules. In its extreme form the doctrine
assumes that reenactment implicitly approves interpretative rules, giv-
ing them "the force of law." 175 The conclusion inexorably follows that
on reenactment the administrative authority loses its power to change
previously promulgated rules, 17 either retroactively or prospectively.'1
This application of the reenactment doctrine, despite its palpable
unsoundness, has been the subject of several Supreme Court decisions.
The most instructive case, now partly discredited, is Hevering v. .R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co.'7 The question was whether a corporation which
buys its own shares and sells them at a profit has a taxable gain. The
only statutory provision was the broad definition of income. The ad-
ministrative practice had been uniformly against taxing, and the regu-
lations so provided when the shares were sold. A Treasury Decision
five years later amended the regulations to provide that when a corpora-
tion deals in its own shares as it might in the shares of another corpora-
tion any gain is taxable. The Court rejected the Commissioner's effort
to apply the amendment retroactively, reasoning that "since the legis-
174. Wage and Hour Interpretative Bulletin No. 1 (1938) provided: "The act doas
not cover plants where the employees work on raw materials derived from vwithin the
State and where none of the product of the plant moves in intrastate commerce." On
March 13, 1945, the Administrator "announced" that because of decisions in Chapman
v. Home Ice Co., 136 F2d 353 (C.C-A. 6th 1943), and Hamlet Ice Co. v. Fleming, 127
F.2d 165 (C.C.A. 4th 1942), the rule was modified to conform to the decisions, but that
the change would not be effective for enforcement purposes until April 15, 1945. The
Administrator, however, had no power to limit the change to a prospective effect with
respect to private suits by employees.
175. See Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 116 (1939):
. . the legislative approval of existing regulations by reenactment of the statutory pro-
vision to which they appertain gives such regulations the force of law... .. See fuller
explanation of the reenactment rule pp. 939-43 supra.
176. See Alvord, Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil Case, 40 Cor. L RLv.
252, 265 (1940): "If the Treasury's construction has received legislative approval, its
interpretation has become fixed in the statute; and the Treasury should have no more
power to change its regulation than it has to change the wording of the statute itself."
177. The doctrine that contemporaneous construction or long-continued construction
should add weight to interpretative rules does not produce the same difficulty because
only the reenactment doctrine depends on the higher authority of Congress.
178. 306 U. S. 110 (1939).
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lative approval of existing regulations by reenactment of the statutory
provision to which they appertain gives such regulations the force of
law, we think that Congress did not intend to authorize the Treasury
to repeal the rule of law that existed during the period for which the
tax is imposed." 179 "The Court expressly left open the question whether
the Treasury could change its rule prospectively after reenactment.
The Court also rejected a contention that reenactment in 1936 and 1938
constituted a legislative approval of the 1934 amendment.180 The Court
might properly have said that in these circumstances a retroactive
amendment of a rule embodying settled law may not adversely affect
a party who has relied on the rule. 81 The case should have been so
decided irrespective of reenactment. 8 2 The Court's unnecessary exalta-
tion of the reenactment doctrine necessitated later backtracking.'83
In the Wilshire Oil case later the same year the Court held that re-
enactment did not prevent amending a regulation prospectively. 18 4 Al-
though the Court seemingly assumed, perhaps erroneously, that the
regulation was legislative, 18 5 the opinion was clear and compelling:
"The oft-repeated statement that administrative construction receives
legislative approval by reenactment of a statutory provision, without
material change . . . does not mean that a regulation interpreting a
provision of one act becomes frozen into another act merely by reenact-
ment of that provision, so that administrative interpretation cannot be
1
179. Id. at 116.
180. That congressional silence is supposed to have amounted to approval of both the
original regulation and the amended regulation tends to show the unsoundness of the re-
enactment doctrine.
181. This is in accord with our reasoning pp. 954-55 supra.
The law was probably settled that a gain could not be realized on the sale of the
corporation's own stock which is has purchased on the market. But the law was the
other way on the closely related question whether a transaction in which a corporation
receives its own shares could result in taxable gain. E.g., Allyne-Zerk Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 83 F.2d 525 (C.C.A. 6th 1936), and cases there cited. In some such cases tie
language was broad enough to cover the question whether a corporation could realize a
gain on sale of its own stock. See e.g., Commissioner v. S. A. Woods Mach. Co., 57 F.2d
635, 636 (C.C.A. 1st 1932): "Where . . . a corporation has legally dealt in its own stock
as it might in the shares of another corporation, and in so doing has made a gain or suf-
fered a loss, we perceive no sufficient reason why the gain or loss should not be taken
into account in computing the taxable income." Cf. Note, 39 CoL. L. REv. 716 (1939).
182. It probably would be so decided today under the doctrine of Helvering v. Rey-
nolds, 308 U.S. 428 (1941).
183. See the following text discussion.
184. Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90 (1939).
185. The Court quoted a grant of rule-making power in section 23 and said that the
regulation was made pursuant to that power. But a careful analysis in Alvord, Treasury
Regulations and the Wilshire Oil Case, 40 CoL. L. Rav. 252 (1940), convincingly dem-
onstrates that another section was the subject of interpretation and that the rule was
interpretative instead of legislative. Nevertheless, the Court's apparent treatment of the




changed prospectively through exercise of appropriate rule-making
power. ... Such dilution of administrative powers would deprive the
administrative process of some of its most valuable qualities-ease of
adjustment to change, flexibility in light of experience, swiftness in
meeting new or emergency situations." "I
This language was carried into definitive holding in Helvering v. Rey-
nolds.8 7 The Revenue Acts of 1921, 1924, and 1926 provided that the
basis of property acquired by inheritance should be the value "at the
time of such acquisition." The Treasury uniformly ruled that a con-
tingent remainder was acquired when the remainder vested. The Acts
of 1928 and 1932 contained different language, and then the Act of 1934
reverted to the earlier language. The taxpayer's father died in 1918,
leaving the taxpayer a contingent interest which vested in 1934. The
question was whether the basis was the 1918 or the 1934 value. The
Court upheld the application of a 1935 regulation making the basis the
1918 value. A contention based on the Reynolds Tobacco case was re-
jected because "that case turned on its own special facts," 1-- ad the
"fact that the regulation was not promulgated until after the transac-
tions in questi6 n had been consummated is immaterial .... The mag-
nitude of the task of preparing regulations under a new act may well
occasion some delay. .... " 189 The Court said of the reenactment doc-
trine: "That rule is no more than an aid to statutory construction.
While it is useful at times in resolving statutory ambiguities, it does not
mean that the prior construction has become so embedded in the
law that only Congress can effect a change. . . . It gives way before
changes in the prior rule or practice through exercise by the adminis-
trative agenc3r of its continuing rule-making power." "I The Reynolds
case not only obliterated the doubts raised by the Reyzolds Tobacco
case as to whether reenactment bars prospective amendments but dem-
onstrated that in some circumstances reenactment does not prevent
even a retroactive amendment.191
186. Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90, 100-1. This is somewhat at vari-
ance with the view taken in Griswold, A Sunmary of thc Regrdalions Problkm, 54 HAnv.
L. REv. 398, 415-7 (1941).
187. 313 U.S. 428 (1941). Despite similarity of name, this case is not to be confused
with Helvering v. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110 (1939), which it partially super-
sedes. See also American Chicle Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 450 (1942), upholding a
prospective change in interpretative regulations after statutory reenactment.
188. Id. at 432.
189. Id. at 433.
190. Id. at 432.
191. In the Reyttlds case, it is arguable that the opposite result should have been
reached on the ground that the uniform administrative interpretation over a long period
had sufficiently settled the law that a retroactive change ought not to be permissible. But
because the Acts of 1928 and 1932 w ere different, the Court could and did regard the
1934 Act as a new one, so that the regulations issued thereunder could properly relate
back to the time of the enactment Two doctrinal aids to construction thus collided, and
both could not be followed. The Court's preference for a particular substantive result no
doubt controlled the choice.
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V. SU-iMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Precise definition of the term "rule" in the abstract may be impos-
sible. But abstract definition is not necessarily desirable, for advanta-
geous classifications usually should depend in part on varying purposes
and contexts. Frequently the best solution of the problem of classifying
mixed or borderline administrative action is to skip the labelling or to
call it mixed or borderline.
The Administrative Procedure Act's definition of "rule" as an
"agency statement of general or particular applicability and future
effect" seems on its face to include cease and desist orders and orders
for the payment of money. Probably the words "or particular" should
be interpreted as meaning only that what is otherwise a rule does not
become an order merely because it applies to named parties. The most
important criterion for classifying an activity under the Act is the
practical desirability or undesirability of applying Section 5, which
does nrot affect rule-making.
The theoretical distinction between legislative and interpretative
rules is of great practical importance even though it is partly false.
Legislative rules are the product of power to create new law, have the
force and effect of law if valid, and are valid if the agency has followed
proper procedure and has acted within statutory and constitutional
authority; courts are not supposed to substitute judgment as to content
of legislative rules. Theoretically, interpretative rules do not embody
new law, and are valid only if the reviewing court agrees with the inter-
pretation or finds it a permissible one; courts commonly substitute
judgment as to content of interpretative rules. The assumption that
interpretative rules do not embody new law is often false, for interpre-
tation, both judicial and administrative, frequently involves creative
determination of policy.
Interpretative rules are usually given extra authoritative weight-
sometimes "force of law"-when they are contemporaneous with the
statute they interpret, when they are of long standing, and when the
statute has been reenacted while the rules are outstanding. The weight
of course depends also on the reviewing court's views of the merits and
on such factors as relative skills of judges and administrators in handling
the particular subject matter. Statutory reenactment without disap-
proval of interpretative rules may in some rare circumstances indicate
legislative approval, but more frequently legislators and draftsmen are
either unaware of the rules or they consider that detailed rules should
be left to administrators to mold and remold.
Despite their general undesirability, retroactive rules are sometimes
unavoidable and are occasionally desirable even when avoidable. When
a problem could not be solved without retroactivity, the Supreme
Court specifically required an agency to issue legislative rules and to
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make them retroactive. Advantages of retroactive rate orders some-
times outweigh disadvantages.
Since interpretative rules frequently create new law, problems of
their retroactivity should be dealt with as such, without reliance on the
false theory that interpretative rules never change the law. Yet it is
retroactive change of settled law, not retroactive clarification of uncer-
tain law, that may be unfair. Even when rules must be changed to con-
formto newjudicial decisions, changes should often be limited to prospec-
tive operation; power so to limit changes should be deemed implicit in
the power to make rules.
The Supreme Court has quite properly retreated from the extreme
application of the reenactment doctrine which made questionable the
power of an agency to change a rule prospectively after the statute's
reenactment. Now even a retroactive change after reenactment is
sometimes permissible.
